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ABSTRACT 
 
 
PROPAGANDA USE BY THE UNION AND CONFEDERACY IN GREAT BRITAIN  
DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1862 
 
 
By 
Annalise L. Policicchio 
August 2012 
 
Thesis supervised by Professor Holly Mayer 
At the beginning of the American Civil War, the United States (the Union) 
already had international diplomatic status, whereas the Confederate States of America 
wanted foreign recognition of its independence.  The two governments sent agents and 
propagandists across the Atlantic, in particular to Great Britain to support their 
objectives.  The Confederacy and the Union used various avenues, including rallies, 
talking with members of Parliament, and publications to convince the British that 
supporting the Confederacy was the correct action to take.  The Union‘s most well-
known weapon emerged in January 1863: the Emancipation Proclamation.  From the 
moment President Abraham Lincoln announced in September 1862 that he would 
emancipate slaves in the rebelling states, the nature of the American Civil War as viewed 
by the British changed.  It could no longer be viewed simply as a war for southern 
 v 
independence, for it became more explicitly about the maintenance or abolition of 
slavery.  For the British, slavery was a moral issue that they would never countenance. 
The propagandists battled not just over slavery and its moral implications but also 
over supplies, and the propaganda battle climaxed over a material issue, that of the 1862 
Florida and Alabama incidents when the Confederacy sneaked the ships out of Britain.  
The Union had tried desperately to convince the British government to stop the ships 
from sailing, but the British government allowed them to sail.  Union outrage over the 
ships, subsequent military victories and the Emancipation Proclamation ultimately 
outweighed the efforts of Confederate diplomats and propagandists to gain open 
international recognition and support. 
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Chapter 1: Historiography of Diplomacy and Propaganda in Great Britain during the 
American Civil War. 
Almost ninety years after the creation of the United States, the young nation was 
torn apart by civil war.  However, this feud between the states soon had trans-Atlantic 
repercussions.  Both the Union and Confederacy immediately understood that European 
support, and particularly that of Great Britain, might provide key supplies, and might also 
be invaluable in negotiations on the diplomatic front.  Great Britain with her powerful 
navy and political clout was an important potential ally to both the Union and 
Confederacy.  But gaining that much-needed British support was not an easy task.  Due 
to political issues within and between European nations, Britain was extremely reluctant 
to jeopardize her domestic and international stability or her economic interests in what 
many saw as an internal conflict with no easily predictable victor.  On the other hand, 
Britain‘s dependence on Southern cotton could lead to Confederate support.  As a result, 
Union and Confederate diplomats, and the propagandist who worked for or with them, 
faced challenging obstacles in seeking British support for their causes.   
Attempts to gain British support involved more than formal diplomacy – it 
included efforts to influence public opinion.  Although some diplomats engaged in such 
efforts, there was a new kind of agent in this front of the war: the propagandist.  
Propagandists not only disseminated news and acted as barometers of the public mood, 
but also expanded their operations into more thorough and in-depth intelligence-gathering 
and disinformation dissemination.  Efforts to gather public support were especially vital 
in Britain, where Union and Confederate agents used intelligence-gathering and the mass 
production of articles and pamphlets to influence all levels of the populace, from the 
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working classes to the top tiers of the government. The two sides had quite different 
goals: the Confederacy strove to gain British diplomatic recognition and support for her 
war effort whereas the Union wanted Britain to remain neutral, refusing the Confederacy 
recognition or any foreign aid.  Although both combatants strove to influence Britain‘s 
stance and actions throughout the war, their agents‘ work in the first few years of the war 
was especially significant because at that point, Britain appeared to be open to arguments 
from both sides.  But by late 1862, following the issuance of the Preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation, the prospect of British support of the Confederacy was 
fading, and the continuance of British neutrality became more of a certainty.   
The Alabama and Florida incidents in 1862 demonstrated the juncture of 
diplomacy and intelligence-gathering by the Union to prevent the construction and 
launching of these ships, a cruiser and a screw sloop-of-war, and of the use of 
propaganda by the Confederacy in an attempt to influence Britain to turn a blind eye to 
the construction of ships for the Confederacy.  This thesis will examine attempts by 
Union agents to convince Great Britain to remain neutral and the equally determined 
attempts by Confederate agents to convince the British government to grant the 
Confederacy diplomatic recognition, supplies, and perhaps, military intervention during 
the first two years of the war. This essay emphasizes the increased role of the 
propagandists in Britain, their role in the outcome of the Florida and Alabama incidents, 
and thus posits the significance of propaganda to diplomatic conflict. 
Academia has categorized the use of propaganda as a tool of diplomacy.  It was 
part of the official ambassadorial job requirements.  For the United States during its civil 
war, this emphasis on propaganda as a tool of diplomacy was seen in the majority of 
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works published on the subject until the mid-1900s.  This narrow definition focused on 
revolved around the diplomats themselves and around the negotiations between 
ambassadors and foreign governments.  The Union chose the diplomat Charles Francis 
Adams to represent its cause in Great Britain.  Adams discussed the possibility of British 
intervention with both Lord John Russell, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and 
Prime Minister Lord Henry John Temple Palmerston.  These discussions illustrated the 
Union‘s traditional approach to diplomacy, working from the top tiers of government 
down.  The Confederacy, on the other hand, sent a number of representatives to Britain.  
The best-known representative was James Mason, a former senator from Virginia.  
Mason tried to follow Adams‘ example by working with the British government.   
Most traditional works on the American Civil War and its impact on Great Britain 
emphasize one part of the conflict or a few key players. This approach to understanding 
the war meant that historians generally ignored the impact that other propagandists had 
on British public opinion.  However, before studying the propagandists‘ roles in Great 
Britain during the years 1861 and 1862, it is necessary not only to examine the myriad of 
players involved in the conflict, but also the global and domestic economic impact of the 
American war on Britain‘s economy.  The changing historiography of the last half of the 
Twentieth century illuminates that impact 
Thus, for the purposes of this paper, traditionalism encompasses works that focus 
on government-to-government diplomacy, military strategy and battles, or focus on one 
part of the conflict or on key players.  Revisionist works more closely examine the impact 
of economics on the American Civil War and some begin to reexamine the importance of 
propaganda.  Works that may be called post-revisionist further expanded the field of 
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historiography by incorporating diplomacy that was not between foreign governments 
and included private discussions and a much larger examination of propaganda and its 
impact on Britain.  This thesis fits within the latter two categories due to its focus on 
propaganda as used by both the Union and the Confederacy and its impact on the attitude 
of Great Britain toward the conflict.   
An early example of the traditional approach is the article ―[A] Biographical 
Sketch of the Hon. Thomas H. Dudley, of Camden, N. J., Who Died April 15, 1893‖ by 
William John Potts.  It was published in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society in January 1895, two years after the Union intelligence agent‘s death and thirty 
years after the end of the American Civil War.
1
  Potts examined Dudley‘s role in Great 
Britain through the eyes of a Mr. William Everett, commenting  that Americans in Britain 
were ―scattered, isolated, scantily informed… taunted, patronized and forced every hour 
to fight the battle of our country‘s honor as truly as… the regiments at home.‖2  Dudley, 
as the United States‘ Consul in Liverpool, was very close to Adams and fought to keep 
important information from prying eyes.  Liverpool, described by many, Potts included, 
as a stronghold of Southern sympathy, was Dudley‘s home base where he acted as a 
vanguard against Confederate influence in Britain.  In Liverpool, Dudley aided Adams by 
determining the validity of information that was gathered by various contacts.
3
  Despite 
Potts‘ decision to limit his study to one person during the conflict, he did break ground 
because he looked beyond Charles Francis Adams and his negotiations with the British 
                                                             
1 William John Potts, ―Biographical Sketch of the Hon. Thomas H. Dudley, of Camden, N. J., 
Who Died April 15, 1893,‖ Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 34 (Jan., 1895), 101-103. 
   
2 Ibid.     
  
3 Ibid. 
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government.  The move beyond Adams and a focus on individual players came to 
epitomize the traditionalist school. 
James P. Baxter, III‘s article, titled ―The British Government and Neutral Rights, 
1861-1865,‖ was published in 1928, sixty-three years after the end of the American Civil 
War.   Baxter‘s work examined the British government and specifically the tug-of-war 
politics between the Union and Britain over British neutrality.
4
  Baxter hypothesized that 
one of the main reasons for Britain‘s decision to remain neutral in the American conflict 
was a concern over precedents that might be set concerning neutrality rights on the high 
seas in a future conflict, and this concern over precedents affected both Confederate 
attempts to gain British recognition and intervention, and Union attempts to convince 
Britain to remain neutral.
5
   
Baxter‘s work focused on and praised British naval Admiral Alexander Milne, 
who was dedicated to maintaining British neutrality in the American conflict.
6
  Milne‘s 
unwavering dedication to preserving British neutrality was repeatedly emphasized and 
became an example of just how effective one man‘s actions could be in historical events 
and of the traditionalist school‘s narrow focus on key players or events during the 
American Civil War.
7
  In a move that would come to exemplify the traditionalist school, 
Baxter did not concern himself with British involvement in Western Hemisphere affairs 
                                                             
4 James P. Baxter, 3rd, ―The British Government and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865,‖ The American 
Historical Review 34 (Oct., 1928), 9-11. 
 
5 Ibid., 10-11. 
 
6 Ibid.   
 
7 Ibid., 18.  There were times when Milne had to be reminded to remain neutral as events escalated 
in the waters surrounding North America and the West Indies, but as mentioned Milne continued to 
maintain Britain‘s neutrality. 
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beyond creating a context for Milne‘s actions; instead, Baxter‘s intent was to show 
Milne‘s dedication to British neutrality, even during disagreements with Union and 
Confederate commanders.  One such incident involved Captain Charles Wilkes, the 
Union officer who arrested Confederate diplomatic representatives James Mason and 
John Slidell while they were en route to Britain aboard the British steamer Trent.  Mason 
was a lawyer educated at the Law School of the College of William and Mary in 1820 as 
well as a senator in the United States government from 1847 to 1861, when he withdrew 
to serve the Confederacy.  Mason‘s cohort, John Slidell, was also a politician, but was a 
businessman in private life.  Slidell formerly served as a Commissioner to Mexico during 
the Texas-Mexico border dispute and as a Louisiana politician.  When the Southern states 
seceded, Slidell sided with the Confederacy despite the fact that he was born in New 
York City.
8
  Following the removal of Mason and Slidell, Great Britain demanded the 
release of the two men, claiming that their removal from a British ship was a violation of 
British neutrality.
9
  The Union eventually released the two men, who traveled on to 
Europe.
10
  Wilkes, after the Trent affair had been resolved was reassigned to safeguard 
Union commerce in the West Indies and Bahamas from attacks by the CSS Florida and 
CSS Alabama in 1862.
11
   
The Trent Affair was a Confederate propagandist‘s dream. Confederate agent 
Henry Hotze railed against Wilkes, the Union commander, in his publication The Index, 
                                                             
8 Anonymous, ―John Slidell, (1793 – 1871)‖, Historical Times Encyclopedia of the Civil War, 
from http://www.civilwarhome.com/slidellbio.htm, (accessed April 5, 2012); ―MASON, James Murray, 
(1798 – 1871),‖ Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/ 
scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=m000216 (accessed April 5, 2012. 
 
9 Baxter, ―The British Government and Neutral Rights,‖ 20-21 
  
10 Ibid. 
  
11 Ibid., 20.  
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writing that Wilkes‘ actions during the Trent affair and the failure of the Union 
government to dismiss him from his post were in bad taste.
12
  Hotze stated that the Union 
government had not acted fairly in responding to the Trent affair, since it reassigned 
Wilkes rather than removing him from the Federal navy or from a position of power.  
Hotze‘s comments were meant to incite anger and distrust among his readers towards the 
Union government for not punishing Wilkes, for embarrassing Great Britain, and for 
breaking international law.  In addition, Hotze implied that the fact that the British 
captain allowed Wilkes to remove Mason and Slidell from his ship was a violation to 
British neutrality.
13
   
In the aftermath of the Trent Affair, Milne gave orders that if any of Milne‘s 
officers observed a British ship being seized in neutral waters, they were not to 
interfere.
14
  In this way, Milne was determined to preserve Britain‘s neutrality in the 
American conflict, and this stance was typical of the traditionalist school, for the focus on 
Milne‘s actions obscured the bigger picture. 
While the role of propaganda was relegated to the background of historical studies 
for many years, it became more important with the publication of Frank Owsley‘s King 
Cotton Diplomacy in 1931.  This work was the beginning of the shift from traditionalist 
to revisionist interpretations of the Civil War, with its introductory study of the 
importance of propaganda in the conflict and an emphasis on economics.
15
  Owsley did 
                                                             
12 Henry Hotze, ―Notes on Events of the Week – America,‖ The Index: A Weekly Journal of 
Politics, Literature, and New, February 11, 1864. http://www.archive.org/details/indexweeklyjourn04hotz, 
82. 
 
13 Ibid.   
 
14 Baxter, ―The British Government and Neutral Rights,‖ 18-19. 
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an excellent job showing the connections between diplomacy, intelligence-gathering, and 
propaganda, three subcategories not previously studied in conjunction.  Despite its heavy 
Confederate bias, as seen in the book‘s emphasis on King Cotton Diplomacy and its basis 
for the Confederate diplomatic strategy, Owsley‘s focus on economics and its impact on 
the diplomatic relationships between the Union, the Confederacy and Great Britain, was 
important.
16
  In addition, Owsley was the historian who really initiated studies into 
propaganda and the British public‘s opinions on the conflict, thus introducing a new 
component to the study of the international dimensions of the American Civil War.
17
   
Owsley‘s work was revisionist because it successfully introduced economics into 
the study of the American Civil War, a subject that had previously been relegated to the 
background.  In addition, Frank Owsley was really the first historian to explore 
propaganda and its impact on Great Britain, enabling historians to look at the war on a 
more social and less political level. Owsley‘s work provided a crucial reconstruction of 
the world in which the Union and Confederate agents operated during the war. 
―The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,‖ written by Wilbur 
Devereux Jones in 1953, challenged the traditionalist view that Britain‘s Conservative 
Party was sympathetic to and gave aid and support to the Confederacy. Traditionalist 
historians argued that Britain‘s Conservative Party supported the Confederacy‘s call for 
intervention, a view that Jones rebutted.
18
  While Jones noted the similarities between 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
15 Frank Lawrence Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States 
of America, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008).   
 
16 Ibid., ix; xix. 
 
17 Ibid., 467. 
 
18 Wilbur Devereux Jones, ―The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,‖ The 
American Historical Review 58 (Apr., 1953), 527-528. 
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elite British landowners and Southern planters, and the distaste the British elite had for 
republican values, Jones argued that these widespread beliefs were not enough to enable 
the traditionalists to argue that British Conservatives hoped for Southern victory.  Indeed. 
Jones argued that new sources, such as the Disraeli Papers, indicated that Conservative 
sympathy for the Confederacy was not as strong as previously believed.
19
  Jones 
contended that the new sources opened avenues of research that were previously 
untouched, and that the previous works declaring that the British Conservatives favored 
intervention on behalf of the Confederacy were faulty.  In criticizing previous works, 
Jones emphasized that the Disraeli Papers in no way affirmed Conservative allegiance to 
one side or the other.
20
 
Furthermore, Jones highlighted the internal divisions within the British 
government over the correct action to take during the war.  Jones emphasized how the 
analysis of public opinion and overall reactions to the war impacted the British 
government‘s ability to remain neutral.  He noted that Lord John Russell commented in 
1862 that much, if not all of the British government, sympathized with the Confederacy 
(something traditionalist interpretations picked up on and emphasized), but later he – and 
the entire government – came under pressure to switch their support to the Union and 
remain neutral, an idea not often accentuated until the traditionalists gave way to the 
revisionists.
21
  Furthermore, how could an observation of Ralph Earle, a former member 
of Parliament, written in a letter to Disraeli that ―we [the British] shall be Southern, more 
                                                             
19 Wilbur Jones, ―The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,‖ 527.   
 
20 Ibid.    
 
21 Wilbur Jones, ―The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,‖ 529 
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or less, sooner or later‖ have any truth, given Britain‘s aversion to slavery, and given that 
the root cause of the American Civil War was slavery?
22
  How could Britain justify any 
type of intervention on behalf of the Confederacy?
23
 Therefore, Jones‘ work moved 
beyond the traditional interpretation that the British Conservatives were in favor of 
intervention on the side of the Confederacy by providing new evidence of societal 
divisions that opened the way for others to examine how American agents tried to use 
those divisions.   
Richard Greenleaf‘s article ―British Labor against American Slavery‖ was 
published a few months after Wilbur Jones‘ piece and addressed the role of propaganda 
in a limited way.
24
  This article was one of the first to comment on American concern for 
British public opinion during the war.  Greenleaf observed that Adams attended a 
convention hosted by John Bright, British abolitionist and reformer, and took notes on the 
speeches presented there, among them speeches by Bright and Karl Marx.  Both Adams 
and Marx were also present at a Trades Union meeting in 1863 - Adams to analyze Bright 
and Marx to present his views.  Adams saw and described forces at work that shaped 
history, whereas Marx saw another way in which to influence the world ―in the direction 
of freedom and equality.‖25  Their audience was composed of artisans, laborers and 
members of London‘s trade societies, who wanted to hear the speakers‘ opinions on the 
                                                             
22 Wilbur Jones, ―The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,‖ 534.  Ralph Earle 
wrote two letters to Disraeli prior to the opening of Parliament in 1863, the halfway point of the American 
Civil War.  The first letter was written in late July 1862, and the second in early February 1863. 
 
23 Ibid. 
 
24 Richard Greenleaf, ―British Labor against American Slavery,‖ Science & Society 17 (Winter, 
1953), 42-43. 
 
25 As quoted in Ibid., 42-43. 
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war.  During his speech to the Trades Union meeting in March, 1863, Bright compared 
the two American combatants, with a specific reference to the ―honoured‖ position of 
laborers in the Union, and the degraded position of laborers (slaves) in the Confederacy. 
Here Bright appealed directly to the British aversion to slavery.
26
  Clearly, a number of 
trade unions were interested in supporting the Union, and Bright‘s speech itself was 
obviously propaganda, since it emphasized the worthiness of the Northern cause.   
Frenise A. Logan‘s ―India—Britain‘s Substitute for American Cotton, 1861-
1865‖ connected Britain‘s empire to the nation‘s attitudes towards the American Civil 
War.
27
  British investors and manufacturers had been worried for some time about their 
dependence on American cotton and had endeavored to find alternate sources of supply.  
Many thought that India was the solution.  Logan emphasized that the manufacturers‘ 
search for alternative supplies was not driven solely by economic factors, but by concern 
over the ―immorality of slavery.‖28  Abolitionists emphasized the immorality of slavery 
as well as the British dislike of the institution – it had been abolished throughout the 
empire in 1832 – in an attempt to further encourage British neutrality.  The Confederacy 
knew that British concerns over the morality of slavery and alternate cotton supplies were 
a threat to its ―king Cotton‖ diplomatic strategy, a view that became a staple of the 
revisionist school. 
Harriet Owsley also wrote about the American Civil War, but focused on one 
person and his accomplishments:  Henry Sanford, a Union propagandist, spy and the 
                                                             
26 As quoted in Greenleaf, ―British Labor against American Slavery,‖ 45.   
 
27 Frenise A. Logan, ―India—Britain‘s Substitute for American Cotton, 1861-1865,‖ The Journal 
of Southern History 24 (Nov., 1958), 472. 
 
28 Ibid. 
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United States minister to Belgium.  However, Harriet Owsley‘s article, published in 
1961, also bridged the gap between traditionalist and revisionist studies, for while she 
focused on one facet of the American conflict, she also emphasized the broader picture, 
emphasizing Sanford‘s connections to Adams and Union Secretary of State William 
Seward.
29
  Owsley‘s focus was on Sanford‘s spy network, which he utilized to gather 
crucial information on the Confederate propagandists‘ movements, information that he 
also used to boost his own propaganda efforts.
30
  Owsley presented the Union in a 
positive light, an opposite view from that of her husband Frank Owsley, and her work 
was a combination of traditionalism and revisionism.
31
 
The revisionist school‘s continued growth was seen with Henry Blumenthal‘s 
―Confederate Diplomacy: Popular Notions and International Realities,‖ published in 
1966.  Blumenthal‘s work took a different look at Confederate diplomacy and the 
realities behind it.
32
  Blumenthal began his study by stating that the Confederacy pursued 
a course that followed ―[the] popular notions and attitudes‖ prevalent in the South and 
ended up with a course of diplomacy that turned out, in hindsight, to be disastrous.
33
  
These ―popular notions and attitudes‖ were the beliefs among the Southern populace that 
the war was going to be short, that the North would eventually let the Confederacy 
secede, and that Great Britain would quickly recognize the Confederacy because of its 
                                                             
29 Harriet Chappell Owsley, ―Henry Shelton Sanford and Federal Surveillance Abroad, 1861-
1865,‖ The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 (September 1961), 225-226.  Both Adams and Seward 
eventually came to believe that Sanford was a loose cannon because his temper often overcame his logic.  
This led to his removal as head of the Union‘s intelligence network in Britain. 
 
30 Ibid., 226. 
 
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Henry Blumenthal, ―Confederate Diplomacy: Popular Notions and International Realities,‖ The 
Journal of Southern History 32 (May, 1966), 151. 
 
33 Ibid. 
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reliance on Confederate cotton, and these beliefs ultimately negatively impacted the 
Confederacy‘s diplomatic goals.34  Blumenthal questioned the overall effectiveness of the 
Confederacy‘s diplomacy and the reasoning behind it, pointing out repeatedly that public 
opinion had too much of an impact on Southern diplomacy.  For example, Confederate 
leaders were very eager to find foreign allies, and Blumenthal implied that this eagerness 
translated into a willingness to accept secondhand assurances that external aid was 
certain, a clear case of the Southern government accepting favorable information without 
verifying its accuracy.
35
  This view ran counter to previous studies because Blumenthal 
focused on more than just the role of economic issues in the quest for foreign aid, 
suggesting that the ultimate failure of Confederate diplomacy did not result solely from 
economic issues, but also from Southern overconfidence.
36
   
Joseph M. Hernon, Jr.‘s 1967 study further stressed the importance of British 
public opinion during the American Civil War, arguing that the standard interpretation 
was too narrow to reach a full understanding of the total picture.  This interpretation was 
mainly based on two sources, and this resulted in a narrow and inflexible interpretation of 
the subject.
37
  His interpretation of British sympathies, however, utilized a number of 
more recent sources in order to make the point that British sympathies were divided 
across both social and economic lines.  This division ensured that diplomats and 
                                                             
34 Blumenthal, ―Confederate Diplomacy,‖ 151. 
 
35 Ibid., 154.  This was seen a few times during the war, but more specifically at the war‘s outset.  
For example, the French minister to the United States – Count Édouard-Henri Mercier implied to his close 
friend John Slidell (the Confederate representative to France) that French recognition of the Confederacy 
was forthcoming. 
 
36 Ibid., 162-163. 
 
37 Joseph M. Hernon, Jr., ―British Sympathies in the American Civil War: A Reconsideration,‖ 
The Journal of Southern History 33 (Aug., 1967), 366.  The two mentioned sources are Ephraim D. 
Adams‘ Great Britain and the American Civil War (1925) and Donaldson Jordan and Edwin J. Pratt‘s 
Europe and the American Civil War (1931). 
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propagandists from both the Union and Confederacy would work tirelessly to change 
British opinion.
38
  Hernon‘s work falls nicely into the revisionist school, for it becomes 
the foundation for a number of articles that not only continued the revisionist school but 
it also aided in the academic switch to the post-revisionist school of thought. 
Mary Ellison‘s work, Support for Secession: Lancashire and the American Civil 
War and Douglas A. Lorimer‘s article titled ―The Role of Anti-Slavery Sentiment in 
English Reactions to the American Civil War‖ both examined British society and its 
divisions during the American Civil War.  Ellison posited that the British middle class 
did not fully support  the Union for several reasons: supporting the Confederacy was 
probably the quickest way to obtain raw cotton; the Emancipation Proclamation was seen 
as somewhat hypocritical, since it still allowed slavery in the border states; many felt that 
a Confederate victory would likely lead to the end of southern slavery; and finally, many 
British believed that American southerners had a fundamental right to choose their own 
form of government.
39
  Ellison also refuted the notion that the lack of agitation from the 
Lancashire workers signified support for the Union, and argued that it cannot be assumed 
that the workers were sympathetic towards the North.  Furthering her point, Ellison stated 
that if the workers supported Lincoln and the North, the evidence was not the lack of 
verbal protest; in fact, Ellison argued that many wanted the South to win and gave the 
Confederacy their moral backing.  Ellison believed that the workers felt only mistrust for 
the Union, a feeling that deepened as the war progressed.
40
  
                                                             
38 Hernon, ―British Sympathies in the American Civil War,‖ 366-367. 
 
39 Mary Ellison, Support for Secession: Lancashire and the American Civil War (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1972), ix. 
 
40 Ibid.  Although Ellison never directly stated that the Lancashire workers refused to support the 
North, her view runs against the grain of later historians such as R. J. M. Blackett and Brian Jenkins, both 
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Lorimer, acknowledged Ellison‘s findings, but focused more on the overall 
impact of anti-slavery sentiment on public opinion.  He examined how the issue of the 
morality of slavery was viewed by the British public, a view that was ever-changing as 
the British social classes grew ever more divided.
41
  
Ellison, Hernon and Lorimer all agreed that the English public was deeply divided 
over which side to support in the American conflict.  Anti-slavery sentiment was a 
difficult obstacle for Confederate propagandists, especially when coupled with the 
growth of abolitionism in Britain and the growing concern with the immorality of human 
bondage.
42
  These moral sentiments became a rallying cry for Union supporters and 
increased the difficulty experienced by the Confederacy in gaining British support.   
The complexities of Britain‘s Civil War diplomacy can be seen in Lord John 
Russell‘s concern with the consequences that Britain would face in the aftermath of the 
American conflict.  Paul H. Scherer‘s article titled ―Partner or Puppet?  Lord John Russell 
at the Foreign Office, 1859-1862‖ presented Russell as a misrepresented man whose 
naturally shy personality was overpowered by the dominant personality of Lord 
Palmerston.
43
   Traditionalists viewed Lord Russell as nothing more than Lord 
Palmerston‘s puppet, while revisionists viewed Russell as a leader with a strong foreign 
policy background.
44
  The post-revisionists argued that while Russell may have done 
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Palmerston‘s bidding on occasion, he also used Palmerston to gain support for his own 
policies.
45
   New collections helped Scherer to compile a much larger picture of what was 
going in Britain during the war, and his article not only focused on Russell during the 
American Civil War but also on his relationship with Lord Palmerston, which in turn 
examined Palmerston‘s involvement in Britain‘s decision to remain neutral and what the 
consequences of that choice meant for both the British public and the government 
officials.    
Both David G. Surdam‘s ―Cotton‘s Potential as Economic Weapon: The 
Antebellum and Wartime Markets for Cotton Textiles‖ and Sven Beckert‘s 
―Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in 
the Age of the American Civil War‖ are firmly entrenched in the post-revisionist school, 
for both built upon and added to older arguments by turning to new evidence that they 
used to better understand propaganda‘s role in Britain.  Economic in scope, Surdam‘s 
article examined how cotton grown throughout the British Empire could alleviate British 
dependence on Confederate cotton.
46
  Ten years after Surdam‘s composition came 
another post-revisionist work by Sven Beckert titled ―Emancipation and Empire: 
Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American 
Civil War.‖  Beckert asserted that the international cotton investors stepped up their 
search for new cotton sources, based on their fears that their total dependence on 
American, and specifically, Confederate, cotton sources could lead to economic 
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disaster.
47
  Like Logan before him, Beckert noted the heavy investment needed for India 
to even approach replacing the American South as Britain‘s chief supplier of cotton.  
India was the only nation that could come close to matching the American South‘s 
production.  
Steven Siegel‘s article on British diplomacy during the first two years of the Civil 
War was also post-revisionist in nature due to its focus on both international and 
domestic diplomacy.
48
  Published in The Concord Review in the fall of 2005, Siegel 
focused on the basic tenets of British diplomacy and on Confederate efforts to convince 
the island nation that recognition of the Confederacy was a better course of action than 
neutrality.  In addition, Siegel‘s exploration of the social class structure of mid-nineteenth 
century Britain was crucial because it reinforced the idea that propaganda might have 
greatly affected the outcome of the American Civil War. Confederate propagandists knew 
that it would be easier to gain recognition if the populace petitioned the government; 
therefore, the British public and government were inundated with numerous requests, 
pamphlets, publications, and information dissemination from both Union and 
Confederate sympathizers to either convince the British government that intervention was 
better than neutrality or vice versa.
49
   
Another example of the post-revisionist school was The Union, the Confederacy, 
and the Atlantic Rim, a collection of short essays edited by Robert May.  This collection 
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provided a more international examination of the Civil War, for as May commented in 
his introduction the main purpose of this collection was to introduce foreign nations into 
the formula of the American Civil War, showcasing the roles that these countries played 
and the urgency that Union and Confederate representatives felt in attempting to gain 
foreign aid.
50
  Of importance here is that the essays also explored the influence that 
British public opinion had on the British government over the issue of intervention. 
51
 
One of the essay authors, R. J. M. Blackett, examined how cotton, African Americans, 
slavery and public opinion all acted as factors in the propaganda battle to gain British 
support.
52
 
Thomas Boaz‘s Guns for Cotton: England Arms the Confederacy examined the 
aid that private British citizens gave the Confederacy.  Boaz wanted to show how the 
dedication of a few enabled the Confederacy to gain desperately needed arms, clothing 
and munitions, as well as limited financial support.
53
  Boaz‘s book connects the 
revisionist school of economic thought begun by Frank Owsley and the post-revisionist 
trend of emphasizing international connections.   
Dean Mahin‘s work, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the 
American Civil War, combined revisionist and post-revisionist analysis.  Mahin asserted 
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that Abraham Lincoln played a much larger role in diplomacy than previously thought.
54
  
Contrary to previous schools of thought that emphasized Secretary of State William 
Seward‘s role, Mahin showed that Lincoln worked with Seward to disguise diplomatic 
maneuvers in order to keep the Confederacy guessing.
55
  Mahin also examined the CSS 
Florida and CSS Alabama incidents that involved the Confederacy‘s attempts to evade 
international law to obtain arms for the war effort.  Mahin analyzed the role of 
propaganda in these two case studies, particularly the Alabama incident, with an 
emphasis on the activities of Union agent Henry Sanford and his attempts to persuade 
Britain to remain neutral.
56
 
Henry Sanford was not the only Union agent in Europe and Great Britain, for 
Thomas Haines Dudley had just as much, if not more, influence on events that occurred 
in the island nation.  David Hepburn Milton‘s Lincoln’s Spymaster: Thomas Haines 
Dudley and the Liverpool Network differed from William John Potts‘ article in a number 
of ways, yet Milton‘s work acted as a connector between the works of Potts and Milton.57   
Milton took the traditionalist route in that he wrote a detailed examination of one 
key player, yet he differed from Potts because he did not isolate Dudley‘s actions from 
the war‘s international aspect.  Rather, Milton portrayed Dudley‘s accomplishments from 
an international perspective while showcasing the overseas theater of intelligence and 
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diplomacy in Britain.
58
  Dudley‘s role as the Consul of Liverpool gave him access to the 
local British populace.  Contradicting Potts‘ assertion that Dudley was rather isolated 
from his fellow Union agents, Milton showed that Dudley worked closely with Charles 
Francis Adams.  Dudley ferreted out information about the Confederate agents stationed 
in Liverpool and elsewhere in Britain and relayed that information to Adams.  This work 
thus combines revisionist and post-revisionist foci and interpretations. 
The impact of the Union‘s blockade on Britain‘s mills in various towns and 
districts was closely examined in Rosalind Hall‘s article ―A Poor Cotton Weyver: 
Poverty and the Cotton Famine in Clitheroe.‖  Hall asserted that as the American Civil 
War increased in length and the Union‘s blockade tightened its hold on Confederate 
ports, raw cotton supplies became increasingly scarce in Britain.
59
  This work observed 
that past historians concentrated on different aspects of the cotton famine, such as the 
relationship between increasing levels of poverty and the tightening of the blockade, or 
how the high level of donations to unemployed mill workers signified benevolent 
treatment.  In this post-revisionist work, Hall took into account both the economic impact 
of scarce cotton supplies and closing mills and the effects on the unemployed triggered 
by different methods of charitable aid distribution, a concept that incorporated both 
traditionalist and revisionist views of the situation in the mill towns during Britain‘s 
cotton famine.
60
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Howard Jones‘ Blue and Gray Diplomacy is post-revisionist in that it broadens 
the study of the American Civil War, by examining the foreign relations of the Union and 
Confederacy from both American and European perspectives.  It shows how 
interconnected the diplomacy of the war truly was.
61
  Jones‘ emphasis on the 
international dimensions of the American Civil War followed Mahin‘s work, comparing 
and contrasting the diplomatic methods of both the Union and Confederacy. 
Joining Howard Jones in the most recent spate of interpretations is Amanda 
Foreman and her work, A World on Fire: Britain’s Crucial Role in the American Civil 
War.  As the title heralds, Foreman focuses specifically on Great Britain‘s impact on the 
American conflict.  Foreman stated that although she had previously been aware of the 
polarization that the American war had caused among the British populace, she was 
surprised to learn that there were many elite Liberals in Britain who supported the 
Confederacy.
62
  Foreman‘s work went above and beyond previous works that examined 
Britain‘s role by exploring the entire Anglo-American relationship from antebellum times 
until just after the war ended in 1865.  In this manner, Foreman successfully traced the 
evolution of British and American relations throughout the war, examining the 
difficulties inherent in gaining Britain‘s agreement for either neutrality or intervention, a 
task that has become a hallmark of post-revisionism.  Britain‘s internal social divisions 
had not been previously linked to foreign influence, making this work rather novel; in 
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this respect, the Anglo-American world shifted and the relationship between the two 
countries was never the same.
63
 
The works above show how vibrant the study of Civil War diplomacy has been.  
This thesis, in turn, offers a contribution to the continuing post-revisionist examination of 
the effects of propaganda and public opinion to diplomatic engagements, but in particular 
on the outcome of the Alabama incident of 1862.  This study focuses on the use of 
propaganda in Great Britain by the Union and the Confederacy so as to assess the overall 
impact of these efforts on Britain during the first two years of the war.   
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Chapter 2: The Development of King Cotton Diplomacy 
 In 1860, just prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, the American South was the 
dominant global producer of raw cotton, and Great Britain was the dominant global 
manufacturer of cotton textiles.
1
  These economic realities set the agenda for Confederate 
diplomatic efforts as the conflict between North and South grew ever more certain.  For 
Great Britain, the need for a constant supply of raw cotton to feed her massive textile 
industry was absolute.  Britain had no source of raw cotton equal to that of the southern 
United States.  For the South, this perceived British need for southern cotton became the 
driving force behind her efforts to gain foreign recognition and aid.  Believing that she 
had Great Britain ―over a barrel,‖ so to speak, the Confederacy ultimately based her 
foreign policy on ―King Cotton.‖  
The cotton industry emerged in the mid-nineteenth century as a major factor in 
the world economy due to both its size and financial worth, with an estimated 20 million 
workers involved in the industry.
2
  The United States became the leading cotton 
producer, and her two largest customers were Great Britain and France, with the former 
importing 658,451,796 pounds of raw cotton from the American South in 1853, 
increasing within five years to 732,403,840 pounds, or about 75 percent of the global 
cotton yields for that year.
3
  These figures demonstrated British dependency on the 
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American South for almost three-quarters of her cotton, a dependency the South would 
attempt to exploit.
4
 
 Internationally, cotton was the primary ingredient for the world‘s burgeoning 
textile industry, one fueled by unparalleled growth in cotton yields.  Whole regions of the 
world, such as Lancashire, England, and Massachusetts mill towns, were dependent on 
cotton shipments for both manufacturers‘ profits and the livelihoods of the mill workers.5  
European nations grew wealthy from importing raw cotton and returning it to the 
international market as a multitude of manufactured products, whereas increasing raw 
cotton and numerous raw materials exports provided the basis for rapid antebellum 
economic growth in the United States.
6
    
 By the late 1850s, American cotton production outranked all international rivals, 
among them British India.  American production accounted for an estimated ―seventy-
seven percent of the 800 million pounds that Britain consumed, ninety percent of the 192 
million pounds imported by France and as much as ninety-two percent of the 102 million 
pounds manufactured in Imperial Russia.‖7 By 1860, United States cotton exports to 
Great Britain were worth about $150 million, with the island nation‘s cotton consumption 
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more than four times that of the North American textile mills.
8
  By the eve of the Civil 
War in 1860, the amount of cotton produced in the American South had risen to more 
than 4.5 million bales.
9
  
 Great Britain worried about her dependence on southern cotton.  As early as 1840, 
Britain recognized the inherent danger of becoming dependent on one source of cotton, 
and she initiated a series of attempts to increase the cotton yields from the Indian 
subcontinent to offset American imports.  The London Economist remarked on the issue 
of Britain‘s need to find alternate sources of cotton:  
We are not surprised that the future supply of cotton should have engaged the 
attention of Parliament . . . It is a question of importance of which can not well 
be overrated, if we refer only to the commercial interests which it involves, or  
to the social comfort or happiness of the millions who are now dependent upon 
it for their support.
10
  
 
The Economist further noted that in 1840, the amount of cotton imported by Great Britain 
was an estimated 592,000,000 pounds, but in the span of eighteen years, that amount had 
risen to roughly 900,000,000 pounds, an increase of about 50 percent.
11
  These numbers 
spurred the British determination to find alternate sources of cotton.   
 The British press shared these fears of becoming too dependent on one nation for 
cotton.  On June 9, 1855, the London Economist remarked that the demand for larger 
cotton shipments had not been met with a corresponding supply.
12
  Then, on September 
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1, 1855, this same newspaper observed the American crop was smaller than usual, and 
due to the continuing danger of American cotton crop fluctuations, it said Great Britain‘s 
continual reliance on the United States posed an economic danger, and an actual 
American crop failure would be disastrous for Britain‘s economy.13  A lack of raw cotton 
would force mills and factories to close, leading to the unemployment of thousands of 
mill workers.  The fact that a large part of the British workforce relied on the textile 
industry for their livelihoods made social revolution due to unemployment in the cotton 
industry not only terrifying, but entirely possible.
14
  Therefore, Britain‘s fears of the 
consequences of depending upon one source for the majority of its imports were 
legitimate.  Clearly, Britain had to find additional sources for cotton imports, and the 
logical place to look for increased cotton production was the British colony of India. 
 Britain had long imported Indian cotton, but the amounts were much smaller than 
those imported from the American South.  Isaac Watts, author of The Cotton Supply 
Association: Its Origin and Progress and a longtime student of the issue of cotton supply, 
observed that the British hoped that India ―would prove the land of promise, and fully 
realise our hopes.‖15   In hopes of increasing Indian cotton exports, Britain sent agents to 
India to gather information and find ways to turn India into a large enough cotton 
exporter to offset American shipments.
16
  The British House of Commons received a 
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report dated February 29, 1848, concerning the obstacles to enhancing Indian cotton 
production, among them soil quality, the Indian revenue system, and the lack of profit for 
the cultivators.
17
  Watts reported on India‘s introduction of foreign strains of cotton 
(especially American and Egyptian) including the American variety known as the ―New 
Orleans,‖ grown in Dharwar, in the Southern Mahratta country of the Indian 
subcontinent.
18
  The climate in this part of India was similar to the American South, since 
it had more rainfall and a higher elevation thanks to the Ghats (mountains).
19
  It was 
hoped that the similar climates would allow for larger cotton yields and thus larger Indian 
exports. 
Not only the British politicians, but also the merchants and cotton manufacturers 
knew how important cotton imports were to the British economy, and this knowledge led 
to the creation of the Cotton Supply Association.  Founded in 1857 by the cotton 
manufacturers of Lancashire, its goal was to try to gather as much information as possible 
on cotton cultivation in any country that had the climate and soil needed for crop 
growth.
20
  To encourage a switchover to Indian cotton, the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce, a collection of concerned cotton manufacturers and merchants, met on 
January 19, 1850, to consider ―whether any course was open whereby an enlarged 
commercial intercourse with India could be promoted, and especially an increased supply 
                                                             
17 Hunt, ed., Merchants’ Magazine and Commercial Review, 666.  This report, witnessed by Mr. 
Francis William Prideaux of the East India House and presented in the British House of Commons was not 
complete; Prideaux cited a lack of information concerning the situation of the cotton cultivators throughout 
the colony; however, the findings that he did present represented a comparison to cultivators in the 
subcontinent, which he cited as ―not differently situated from the cultivator of other produce.‖  
 
18 Watts, The Cotton Supply Association, 16.  
 
19 Ibid. 
 
20 Ibid., 17.  
 28 
of cotton obtained‖ in order to lessen British dependence on American cotton.21  The first 
resolution passed by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce called for a consideration of 
all other cotton producers in hopes of finding a suitable supplement for American 
cotton.
22
  While this was an excellent suggestion, and other areas of the world possessed 
good climates for growing cotton, producers such as Brazil, the West Indies, and Egypt 
did not harvest enough cotton to make a significant impact.
23
   
This fact, when added to the even smaller cotton supply from British India, 
created a situation in which Britain was unable to break free of its reliance on American 
cotton.  The London Economist commented on the lack of substantial increase in cotton 
shipments from India to British ports, stating that: 
          From British India the supply is relatively shorter than from the United States.  It   
          fails us more than that of the States [American South], and the fact is rather  
          unfavorable to the speculations of those who wish to make us independent of the  
          States, and dependent chiefly on our own possessions. … In 1855, when we have a  
          short supply from other quarters, India has sent us one-third less than in 1853.‖24 
 
The crux of the situation was this: if Britain‘s empire was unable to supply a sufficient 
amount of cotton to supply the mother country‘s cotton industry, then Britain could not 
break her dependence on American cotton.
25
  Britain‘s dependency on the United States 
for cotton was thus a crucial factor in its relations with its former colonies – and it would 
                                                             
21 Watts, The Cotton Supply Association, 10. 
 
22 In an interesting side note, Watts does not mention Lancashire as being particularly concerned 
with Britain‘s reliance on one nation for cotton.  He remarked that the Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
itself was also taken aback at the confidence with which Lancashire operated, particularly when the 
majority of her domestic economic market was reliant in one form or another on the cotton trade. 
  
23 As cited in Christy, Cotton is King, 63.  
 
24 As cited in Ibid., 61. 
 
25 As cited in Ibid. 
 
 29 
become a factor that American southerners tried to exploit in their attempts to achieve 
their independence. 
          Joining with the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, the Cotton Supply 
Association adopted the Chamber‘s goal of encouraging cotton growth in every suitable 
part of the world in order to offset the dependence on imported America cotton.
26
  
Domestically, the Cotton Supply Association petitioned the British Parliament 
concerning the issue.  In the petition, the Association stated that it was Parliament‘s duty 
to ―adopt the most prompt and effectual measures for rendering India capable of 
furnishing an ample supply of improved cotton.‖27  The petition further stated that a 
substantial investment was needed to create the necessary infrastructure to enable India to 
become a substantial cotton supplier.  This task, the Cotton Supply Association noted,   
was the responsibility of the British government.
28
  Additionally, the Cotton Supply 
Association‘s petition to the House of Commons listed a number of reasons why the 
Association felt the need for large monetary investments in India, all of which dealt with 
the advantages that American cotton growers possessed over their Indian rivals.  Two of 
those American advantages were access to more capital than India, and easy access to 
both water and land-based communications and infrastructure not enjoyed in India.
29
   
 Both the Cotton Supply Association and the Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
sent agents abroad to gather first-hand evidence of the results of British investment in 
                                                             
26 Frenise A. Logan, ―India—Britain‘s Substitute for American Cotton, 1861-1865,‖ The Journal 
of Southern History 24 (Nov., 1958),), 472-473; Watts, The Cotton Supply Association, 11-12.   
 
27 Cotton Supply Association Petition to the House of Commons, ―Where is Cotton to come from 
to keep the mills at work?‖, May 7, 1861, ―House of Commons Papers,‖ v. 44 (London: British Parliament, 
1863), 55, Available from Google Books.  Cited hereafter as ―House of Commons Papers,‖ v. 44. 
 
28 Ibid. 
 
29 Ibid. 
 30 
India and of the attempts at increasing cotton yields globally.  Although the resulting 
reports were optimistic, they also noted several obstacles yet to be overcome, one of 
which concerned finding the correct type of land and climate for growing cotton.  
Investigative reports stated that cotton could be grown anywhere in temperate and/or near 
tropical regions of the globe, and for the British Empire, upon which the Sun never set, 
this meant multiple prospective regions.
30
  Accordingly, British consuls in those regions 
where it might be possible to grow cotton were asked to distribute seeds to farmers and to 
do everything in their power to increase the crop‘s growth, all with mixed results.31 
India became a proving ground of sorts for Britain in terms of finding another 
source of cotton and demonstrating that the necessary amounts of cotton could be 
produced without the use of slaves.  An issue of the London Economist, dated February 
12, 1859, stated that India was certain to become a successful cotton producer due to the 
availability of inexpensive land and large pools of cheap labor.
32
  The Economist 
continued by asserting that whatever financial sacrifice was needed, including investment 
in transportation and other infrastructure, should be done enthusiastically, for it was the 
only way for India to become a large-scale cotton producer.  This, in turn, would not only  
Increase the amount of cotton available globally, but also lower prices, thereby benefiting 
those nations who imported large amounts of the fiber.
33
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In the decade prior to the American Civil War, the amount of cotton exported 
from India did indeed rise, evidence that British investment and focus on the subcontinent 
was somewhat successful, but the American South also continued to increase its yields.  
The English Board of Trade‘s annual report for 1859 corroborated this fact, for it showed 
that even though Britain had spent over twenty years investing in India‘s cotton trade, 
only about 60,000,000 pounds were exported from the Southeast Asian subcontinent, a 
difference of only 10,000,000 pounds when compared to the total amount exported in 
1800.
34
  Britain had obtained an increase of less than 20 percent in the face of continual 
demand for cotton and the United States‘ increasingly high-yield cotton harvests since 
1800.
35
   
Watts estimated that by 1860, the United States produced roughly 85 percent of 
the cotton that Britain imported for use in her mills and factories, despite the increased 
amounts of Indian cotton exports.
36
  In fact, when the numbers for 1860 were examined, 
Britain imported 562,738 bales of cotton from India, each weighing 400 pounds, a decent 
amount, but only about 21 percent of the cotton Britain imported from the United States 
during the same year.
37
  Clearly, American cotton exports continued to dominate.   
By April 1861, after years of attempts by various groups in Britain and throughout 
the British Empire to increase Indian cotton production, the London Economist publicly 
conceded defeat, telling its readers that Indian cotton was never going to be able to 
compete with its American cousin.  The Economist cited a number of reasons for this 
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defeat, primary among them that Indian raw cotton ―loses more in the process of spinning 
[than American raw cotton].‖38  In other words, when Indian cotton was spun into 
manufactured products and yarn, the combination of large amounts of generated waste 
and the increased time it took to spin undermined profits.  The same machinery, 
according to the Economist, produced ―ten to twenty percent more American yarn than 
Surat (Indian) yarn.‖39  Some of the reasons behind the excess waste were that Indian 
cotton possessed shorter fibers and a higher dust content when compared to American 
cotton, and the manufactured cloth was also thinner, a flaw that bolstered the continued 
popularity of American cotton.
40
 
In addition, calls made for investments to improve the efficiency of the Indian 
transportation system to provide for easier shipment of cotton from India to Britain and to 
lower the cost of transporting Indian cotton had not been successful.  The British 
government looked to both domestic parties and its colonial governors in India for plans 
to improve transportation systems and obtain more investment.  Watts related how a 
proposal had been submitted to the British government and the East India Company in 
1857 ―to raise and apply a sum of four millions annually, for five years, in such public 
works as… necessary, for the development of the industry and commerce of India.‖41   
The British government considered the proposal, but did not agree to it or subsequent 
propositions, such as one that would have ―improve[ed] the quality, and reduce[d] the 
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cost of cotton exported from India to this country [Britain]… by an estimated… 
£286,000.‖42   
 However, some, such as the Cotton Supply Association, were unwilling to give up 
on India.  In 1861, the Cotton Supply Association once again suggested that the British 
government open ―the navigation of the River Godavery as a means of access to the vast 
cotton fields of Berar.‖43  It also remarked that India merely needed Britain to direct her 
―skill, enterprise and capital… to the development of the agricultural resources of India, 
that …would speedily be rendered capable of supply cotton of as good quality as that 
now furnished by the restricted and costly slave labour of the United States.‖44  Its 
exhortations appeared to fall on deaf ears. 
During all this time, war loomed larger in the United States.  It came as no 
surprise that when war did erupt, the relationships that had underpinned the global 
economics of the cotton industry became increasingly frayed.  Upon the South‘s 
secession, the federal government of the United States (the American North) passed the 
Morrill Tariff in an attempt to protect and encourage the growth of her own industries by 
imposing high duties on foreign imports.
45
  While still part of the Union, the South had 
                                                             
42 Watts, The Cotton Supply Association, 17-18.  Watts does not give a specific reason as to why 
the British government refused to act on the numerous petitions it received about public works in India, but 
hypothesizes that irregular occurrences in India may have been to blame.  It should also be noted, however, 
that the occurrences that Watts attributed to preventing the British government‘s involvement in 
constructing public works were not mentioned specifically, but rather received a vague reference. 
 
43 ―House of Commons Papers,‖ v. 44, 56. 
 
44 Ibid., 55.  The last part of this quotation references a moralistic belief that many sectors of 
British society, including emancipation societies, thought true.  This belief was the idea that slave-grown 
cotton was somehow more impure than that grown by hired or free labor.  As already mentioned, India 
possessed a large amount of free labor, waiting to start work on cultivating increased cotton growth, and for 
those in Britain who wanted an alternate cotton source, many also wished that the new supply be grown and 
harvested by free labor, not slaves, thereby making it more pure.  
 
45 Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 54. 
 34 
prevented the tariff‘s passage because it benefitted the North‘s industrial sectors and not 
the South‘s agrarian economy, and it would also have made trade more difficult for the 
South, dependent as she was on imported foodstuffs and manufactured products.
46
 
Furthermore, the tariff would also roil the British society for it would dampen Southern 
demand for British manufactured goods.   
Britain, recognizing that a civil war was inevitable in the United States, had been 
purchasing cotton in huge amounts, so that by the time the war actually began, Britain 
possessed a surplus of cotton that was so large it would take about two years to consume, 
so it was therefore not in great need of Confederate cotton.
47
  The fact that it possessed 
such a large cotton surplus was a factor in the failure of the Confederacy‘s King Cotton 
Diplomacy. 
Upon establishing the Confederate States of America and as war became 
inevitable, the self-declared southern confederacy knew that it needed a strategy to gain 
foreign recognition, and it decided to use cotton as a bargaining chip with European 
nations, particularly Britain, because of their strong dependence on American cotton.    A 
series of articles written by a number of different authors also fostered this belief and the 
resulting diplomatic strategy.  The first of these works was the anthology of books and 
pamphlets, Cotton Is King and the Pro-Slavery Arguments Comprising the Writings of 
Hammond, Harper, Christy, Stringfellow, Hodge, Bledsoe, and Cartwright on This 
important Subject, edited by E. N. Elliot.  In his work from this book, ―Cotton is King: 
or, Slavery in the Light of Political Economy, Ohioan David Christy stated that in order 
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to avoid bloodshed and assure the peaceful secession of the South, negotiations between 
the two sections of the United States had to take place according to southern terms, 
among which was the idea that ―Cotton is King.‖48  This phrase later became 
commonplace throughout the South, repeated by politicians and masses alike.
 49
  The 
phrase, ―Cotton is King,‖ appears to have originated in a speech given by Senator James 
Henry Hammond on March 4, 1858.  Hammond, responding to a speech by Senator 
William Seward given the previous day, argued that the southern exports were about 
twice that of the North, and this did not include another $40,000,000 in products sent to 
the North.  In arguing against a protective tariff, Hammond claimed that the passage of 
such a tariff would be the equivalent of declaring war on cotton.  Hammond ominously 
warned that by not planting cotton, the South could bring about the collapse of the entire 
global economy, including that of the North.  Hammond proclaimed ―No, you dare not 
make war on cotton.  No power on earth dares to make war upon it.   Cotton is king.‖50   
This idea, later shortened to ―King Cotton,‖ took hold and soon many in the Confederacy 
were convinced that Great Britain had no choice but to support her main cotton supplier 
in this conflict.  A prominent Georgian secessionist, Thomas R. R. Cobb, wrote on 
February 19, 1861, ―that Great Britain, France and Russia will acknowledge us at once in 
the family of nations,‖ a statement that summarized the feelings of many Southerners at 
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the beginning of the American Civil War.
51
  It became a common Confederate 
assumption that European nations would intervene on the side of the Confederacy if war 
erupted, in order to keep their economies intact.
52
  
 Further evidence of this belief was seen in British Consul Robert Bunch‘s report 
to Lord John Russell, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, concerning an encounter 
on December 15, 1860, with prominent Southerner Robert Barnwell Rhett.  Bunch 
reported that Rhett questioned him as to the probability of the British offering support to 
the Confederacy, to which Bunch replied that he had no power to comment officially on 
the subject, nor could he offer an opinion on it.
53
  Rhett, however, was insistent and said 
that the Confederacy would prefer to have Great Britain as an ally rather than enemy, a 
policy that he personally believed would benefit both nations but particularly Britain, 
which was still dependent on American cotton.  Bunch also remarked that Rhett noted 
numerous economic benefits for Britain should she ally with the South, among them an 
―an interchange of commodities …which would lead to an unrestricted intercourse of the 
most friendly character.‖54  Bunch attempted to alert Rhett to the folly of assuming that 
Britain and other European nations would automatically support the Confederacy, but 
Rhett, supremely confident in his beliefs, assured Bunch that even if slavery was an issue, 
foreign recognition would come swiftly for the Southern states.  Bunch pointed out that 
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Britain would like to see the internal southern slave trade abolished, but Rhett argued that 
to do so would be a de facto admission that the institution of slavery was obsolete, 
something the Confederacy would never do.
55
  Despite Bunch‘s refusal in any way to 
commit to British support of the Confederacy, Rhett believed he heard an implied 
assurance that Britain would recognize the Confederacy, and his belief matched the 
American South‘s firm belief that King Cotton diplomacy was the solution to the 
Confederacy‘s desire for European recognition.   
This discussion between these two men showed the centrality of an issue the 
South preferred to avoid, that of the morality of slavery.  Rhett blithely dismissed British, 
moral concerns, even as Bunch tried to emphasize their importance.  The relationship 
between cotton and slavery, a relationship especially visible in the American South, was 
a sensitive one for Britain.  The slave-based economy of the South fueled abolitionist 
demands for less reliance on slave-grown cotton.  British economist J. T. Danson 
commented on the connections between cotton, American slavery and British 
manufacturing, stating that ―there is not, and never has been, any considerable source of 
supply for cotton, excepting the East Indies, which is not obviously and exclusively 
maintained by slave-labour.‖56  Britain had abolished slavery throughout its empire in 
1832, which meant that for the British, a nation such as Confederate States of America 
that was dependent upon slavery to increase her material wealth was morally inferior (the 
British conveniently forgot that Britain had also allowed slavery to flourish in its empire 
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in the past).  Danson‘s comment captured the feelings of a number of the British 
emancipation societies of the time, many of which desired the continuation of the cotton 
trade but not the use of slaves to grow and harvest the cash crop.
57
 
In a review of the international relations of the mid-nineteenth century, historian 
Robert E. May commented that ―world opinion‖ was not in favor of the continuance of 
slavery.
58
  Britain was not the only nation to have abolished slavery: by 1861 both 
Austria and Imperial Russia had outlawed serfdom, and France and the majority of Latin 
American nations had not allowed slavery for decades.
59
  Therefore, the fact that the 
American South continued to cling to slavery was upsetting to many European nations. 
That was one of the problems the new Confederacy faced as it tried to establish 
diplomatic ties.  Another was trying to organize quickly so as to send ambassadors 
abroad.  Initially, it relied on informal contacts and meetings such as the one between 
Rhett and Bunch, and upon information gathered by friends of the Confederacy.  For 
example, Seward met with Lord Lyons, British consul to the United States in an 
unscheduled visit on March 20, 1861 where he attempted to sound out British reaction to 
a possible Union interruption of the southern cotton supply.  Seward, pressing Lyons for 
information, provoked a blustery response from Lyons, who declared that if the North 
interrupted the cotton trade, ―the most simple, if not the only way [to fight back] would 
be to recognize the Southern Confederacy.‖60  This information was most likely relayed 
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to the Confederate leaders.  William Howard Russell, a correspondent for the London 
Times, traveled throughout the United States, including the South, meeting with future 
Confederate Attorney General, Judah P. Benjamin, in Charleston, South Carolina in late 
1860.  During that meeting Benjamin observed that a British refusal to recognize 
Confederate letters of marque would be ―nothing more or less than a declaration of war 
against us . . .‖61  Benjamin, confident that Britain was desperate to continue the southern 
cotton trade, drew the conclusion from Russell‘s responses that British recognition of the 
Confederacy would soon be forthcoming.
62
  By the time the Confederacy actually sent 
official representatives abroad, most Southerners were convinced that cotton was the key 
to a Confederate victory.  Southerners had persuaded themselves that British desperation 
for southern cotton would bring official recognition, aid, and perhaps even intervention 
on the Confederate side.   
 In their belief that cotton – or the lack thereof – was the key to British support, the 
Confederacy chose a tactic that would ultimately backfire – it placed a voluntary 
embargo on cotton exports to Europe in 1861.
63
  The reasoning behind this decision was 
perfectly in line with the Confederate certainty that ―King Cotton‖ diplomacy would 
work.  The Confederacy reasoned that as cotton supplies dwindled, European nations, 
Britain in particular, would suffer economically as workers were laid off and profits fell.  
To save their economies, European nations would intervene on behalf of the 
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Confederacy.
64
  The Confederacy resolved not to lift the embargo until the North ended 
its blockade of Confederate ports – implemented in April 1861 – and Confederate 
independence was recognized.
65
  
 As part of Lieutenant General Winfield Scott‘s Anaconda Plan, Lincoln instituted 
a naval blockade of Confederate ports in April 1861 shortly after the attack on Fort 
Sumter.  The purpose of the blockade was to stop Confederate exports, especially cotton, 
thereby destroying the financial basis of the Confederate economy and preventing 
Confederate access to outside supplies.
66
  The South, along with its belief that the cotton 
embargo would bring foreign recognition, also thought that it would preempt the Union‘s 
own plans to stop cotton exports and thus destroy the Confederacy financially.  This 
obviously made sense to the Confederacy, but it did not make financial sense.  During the 
first year of the Union blockade, the Confederacy could easily have shipped her bumper 
crop of cotton abroad due to the spottiness of the blockade itself, thereby earning hard 
currency that could have been used to purchase much needed supplies.
67
  However, the 
South was so convinced that the embargo would work, and that Britain, without Southern 
cotton, according to Senator Hammond, ―would topple headlong and carry the whole 
civilized world with her,‖ that it failed to understand the damage the embargo would do 
to the South.
68
  In fact, the Confederate belief in the efficacy of King Cotton diplomacy 
was absolute.  As William Russell observed to his readers, ―King Cotton Diplomacy‖ 
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was ―a lively all-powerful faith without distracting heresies or schisms.  They [the 
southerners] have in it enunciated their full belief.‖69 
At first, cotton diplomacy appeared to be working.  As cotton shipments ceased, 
and in response to government queries, British representatives stationed in the 
Confederacy sent word that this move had indeed been voluntary and not forced. One 
such message came from Consul Bunch, who wrote Lord Russell in 1861, commenting 
that Southerners believed that withholding cotton for one year from Great Britain would 
plunge the island nation into social chaos and economic depression.
70
  Shortly after the 
embargo was instituted and the Union blockade implemented, Queen Victoria of Great 
Britain issued a Proclamation of Neutrality that not only declared Britain neutral in the 
American Civil War, but also extended to the Confederacy belligerent status. This did not 
equate with recognition, but merely gave the Confederacy the legal right to seize ships 
and confiscate enemy goods based on the Confederate right of self-preservation.  This 
proclamation was interpreted by the Confederacy as an example of strong support, but the  
Union was horrified, believing that the Proclamation implied that the Confederacy was 
indeed a legal entity.
71
  
As the Confederacy became better organized, it began to send diplomats abroad, 
and here the Confederacy was at a definite disadvantage when compared to the Union. 
The Union‘s representatives possessed more diplomatic expertise and were better known 
than their Confederate counterparts.  The Confederate representatives were often 
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domestically important, but possessed no international experience.  The Union‘s 
diplomatic hopes rested on its minister to Britain, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., and on a 
number of other ministers, among them Henry S. Sanford, the minister to Belgium.   On 
the other hand, the Confederacy shipped three different groups of diplomats and/or 
propagandists overseas during 1861 and 1862 to negotiate with European governments.   
The Confederacy first sent three diplomats, William Yancey, Pierre Rost and 
Ambrose Dudley Mann, abroad in early 1861.  Their mission was to seek official 
recognition and negotiate treaties of commerce with all of the major European nations, 
but primarily Britain.  They were instructed to argue that secession was justified as a 
means of self-preservation following the passage of the protective tariff levied by 
Congress.  Furthermore, the three men were to show that the South had set up an orderly 
government and could maintain itself since it controlled much of the eastern and southern 
coasts of the United States.  These arguments, however, provided no inducement for 
Britain or any other nation to support the Confederacy, so the men were instructed to 
emphasize that an independent Confederacy could offer virtually free trade to Europe 
with almost no tariffs, and this would apply to the cotton that Europe, and especially, 
Britain, was dependent upon.  The three men met with Lord Russell on May 3, 1861, and 
although Lord Russell gave no indication of forthcoming British support, Yancey and 
Mann reported to Richmond that they believed that ―recognition would not long be 
withheld.
72
  However, following a subsequent interview on May 9, the three men reported 
to Richmond that they now believed that the English government would postpone the 
―recognition of the independence of those States . . . as long as possible, at least until 
some decided advantage is obtained by them or the necessity for having cotton becomes 
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pressing.‖73  By September 1861, Yancey appeared to have lost all hope of gaining 
British recognition and resigned his post, resulting in the dissolution of the group.  
Yancey and Rost were replaced by James Mason and John Slidell. 
Despite this diplomatic setback, by the end of 1861, the Confederacy was 
convinced that its future was bright.  Based on its absolute belief that cotton diplomacy 
would work, it sent representatives abroad to negotiate treaties of recognition and 
commerce, confident that their mission would be successful.  This Confederate 
confidence was due to the newly instituted cotton embargo that the South believed would 
bring Europe and particularly, Great Britain to its knees and result in widespread 
unemployment, profit loss, social unrest, and perhaps even rebellion.  As British mills ran 
out of cotton, Britain would be forced to grant official recognition to the Confederacy, 
provide aid, and perhaps even intervene on behalf of the Confederacy in order to protect 
her textile industry and her economy.  The Union blockade was dismissed as ineffective 
due to the Confederate belief that it had, with its cotton embargo, preempted the 
purported purpose of the blockade: to financially destroy the South.  Reassured by 
informal contacts with the British and by Queen Victoria‘s proclamation, the 
Confederacy was convinced that it would not have to wait long for British support.  
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Chapter 3:  The Union and Confederacy Resort to a War of Propaganda 
 Propaganda is not a twentieth-century phenomenon, although the word usually 
brings to mind images of posters, pictures and phrases from World War II.  Although 
both the Union and the Confederacy attempted to use propaganda, information gathering 
and dissemination, it was especially important for the weaker party, the Confederacy, that 
its propaganda efforts were successful in swaying British governmental and public 
opinion.  The Confederacy desperately sought diplomatic recognition and aid, while the 
Union sought only to maintain the status quo.  
At the outset of the American Civil War in 1861, the Confederacy relied heavily 
on King Cotton Diplomacy, believing that the loss of cotton imports from the American 
South would force the European powers, and especially Great Britain, to recognize the 
fledgling nation.
1
  As war erupted, the Confederacy hoped that King Cotton Diplomacy 
would be effective and was dismissive of the deep abolitionist feelings within Britain and 
the reluctance of the British government to get involved in a war that might have no clear 
winner.
2
   
In addition to King Cotton Diplomacy, Confederate President Jefferson Davis 
attempted to manipulate foreign nations into supporting the South in a number of other 
ways.  For example, Davis framed the conflict as one in which the South was asking for 
―nothing more than independence,‖ an innocuous argument that could easily win foreign 
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recognition.
3
  Davis also played to British fears of the growing commercial power of the 
Union by implying that a Confederate victory would restrain that growth, reducing its 
threat to the commercial power of Great Britain.
4
  Furthermore, Davis appealed to the 
mutual respect and kinship between Southern conservative plantation owners and the 
English aristocratic country gentlemen, arguing that such mutual respect ―held out the 
promise of far-reaching co-operation and understanding‖ between the two nations.5  
While some, such R. B. Rhett, believed that recognition would lead to British 
governmental aid, others hoped for aid from supportive British private parties, such as the 
British country gentlemen.
6
     
Davis might have hoped as Rhett did, for he was certainly aware of the need for 
vast amounts of military supplies to equip the new Confederate army, but he chose not to 
ask European governments for those supplies when he asked for recognition.  Instead the 
new president of the Confederacy turned to private firms and connections to find the 
necessary equipment.  The Confederate government chose the firm of John Fraser & Co., 
with offices in Charleston and subsidiaries in New York (later closed and reopened in 
Nassau) and Liverpool, to act as its agent in purchasing supplies from Britain.
7
  The 
Confederate government deposited its funds with John Fraser & Co. in Charleston, and 
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the firm issued letters of credit on those funds to the Fraser subsidiary in Liverpool, 
which then used those letters of credit to pay for purchases made by Confederate agents 
in Britain.
8
   In addition, Davis set up the Confederate Ordnance Bureau under the 
command of Josiah Gorgas.  Gorgas was ordered to equip the proposed 100,000 man 
Confederate army.  Knowing that the available domestic supplies were inadequate, 
Gorgas ordered Captain Caleb Huse to Europe to buy ―whatever was needed and 
available,‖ and to arrange for them to be shipped back to the Confederacy.9  Using letters 
of credit made available by the Fraser subsidiary in Liverpool, Huse was successful in 
securing the purchase of weapons for the Confederacy, and he remained in England, later 
working with James Bulloch and Major Edward Anderson to scour Britain for weapons 
to send to the Confederacy.
10
  Indeed, Davis was so pleased with Huse‘s success that he 
sent instructions to Huse telling him to ―acquire arms as he saw fit, and to act upon his 
own responsibility and not be controlled by other government agents.‖11  
Compared to the Confederacy, the Union began the war with an existing 
intelligence network made up of ambassadors and consuls, such as Charles Francis 
Adams, Union ambassador to Great Britain, Henry Shelton Sanford, Union ambassador 
to Belgium, and Thomas Haines Dudley, who was both the United States consul in 
Liverpool, England, and the man who would become famous for discovering Confederate 
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plans to pay for the construction and arming of ships in Britain for Southern use.
12
  
Dudley worked closely with other Union agents, including Sanford, and the Union consul 
in London, Freeman Harlow Morse, to gather intelligence and counter his Confederate 
foes.   
Adams played a major role in both Union diplomatic and propaganda efforts 
during the American Civil War.  Traditionally, historians credited diplomats such as 
Adams for retaining of British neutrality; however, Adams‘ working relationships with 
Henry S. Sanford and Thomas Haines Dudley make claims that Adams operated alone 
invalid.
13
  Adams corresponded with several British civilians including Karl Marx.
14
  
Adams also worked closely with the leaders of the British government, such as Lords 
Russell and Palmerston, hoping to convince them to maintain British neutrality.  For 
example, Adams issued a statement countering claims that Britain had recognized the 
Confederacy‘s belligerent status through its issuance of a proclamation of neutrality.15  In 
an interview with Russell on May 18, 1861, Adams protested that the proclamation of 
neutrality had been made in haste and showed favor towards the Confederacy ―before 
they had ever showed their capacity to maintain any kind of warfare whatever… It 
considered them a marine power before they had ever exhibited a single privateer upon 
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the ocean.‖16  Adams worked hard to convince the British government that siding with 
the Confederacy was the wrong action to take, and his increasing frustration at Britain‘s 
refusal to interfere with Confederate purchases came to a head with the 1862 Alabama 
incident, in which he and Dudley failed to prevent Britain from selling and the 
Confederacy from launching the ship for use in the war. 
Henry Sanford had spent years in Europe, spoke several languages, and had 
established a network of contacts, all of which made him eminently suited to work as 
both a propagandist and a spy.  Although he was officially the United States Minister to 
Belgium, he spent most of his time in Great Britain, preferring to gather and disseminate 
information for the Union there.  He and Morse, both present in London for six months 
prior to Dudley‘s arrival, set up a network of detectives to spy on Confederate activities, 
and Sanford hired local spies in the hopes of gathering more information.  In fact, by the 
end of 1861, Sanford was making plans to take over the entire intelligence network 
himself, but these plans fell through.   
Sanford uncovered evidence of the Confederate shipments arranged by Huse and 
others.  Sanford often acted as a spy in his official capacity as minister to Belgium, as 
evidenced in his dispatches addressed to Seward that November and December, 
informing him of Confederate purchases of cloth for military uniforms in Britain.
17
 
Sanford found out that these purchases were being shipped to New Orleans, then under 
Confederate control.
18
  The French consul in New Orleans was to receive the shipment, 
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which would then be sold to the ―rebel authorities.‖19  Earlier that year, Sanford, working 
with Morse, hired a police detective, Ignatius Pollaky, to set up a surveillance system to 
identify as many Confederate agents as possible.  These Union spies were not above 
opening mail and tracking the daily movements of the suspects once they identified 
them.
20
  Furthermore, Sanford stationed Union agents at the major ports and steamship 
companies to monitor outgoing Confederate war supply shipments, and this eventually 
led to the discovery of the Fingal, an incident that will be discussed in Chapter 4.
21
   
Additionally, Sanford was adept at utilizing the European press to keep the 
Confederacy from garnering support.  Initially, Sanford favored letting Union military 
victories speak for themselves, but as the South won an increasing number of victories, 
Sanford realized that the Union had to direct its diplomatic and propaganda efforts 
towards keeping Britain from recognizing the Confederacy.
22
  Sanford worked with both 
the British and French presses, convincing newspapers to print rebuttals to Confederate 
propaganda, and even bought space in some newspapers, such as the Independent Belge, 
so that pro-Union articles could be printed.
23
  He was so certain that these tactics would 
work that he wrote to Seward that the Union had ―a pulpit to preach from which reaches a 
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large audience & I consider it a very important gain.‖24   
Despite his accomplishments, other Union agents, such as Charles Francis 
Adams, saw Sanford as somewhat of a liability, for they viewed Sanford‘s network as 
useful but costly, especially since Adams and Morse, working together, were obtaining 
much the same information as Sanford and his network.
25
  Other Union-affiliated agents, 
and even President Lincoln, believed that Sanford‘s quick temper could provoke British 
ire and possibly involve the Union in a war that neither side desired, and for which the 
Union was almost certainly not prepared.  Eventually, a consensus was reached that 
Sanford was a liability.
26
  As a result, Lincoln and Seward limited the Belgian minister‘s 
actions.  Lincoln and his government praised Sanford for his ―active and intelligence 
services for detecting traitorous proceedings,‖ but ordered him to turn over to Morse his 
duties as an intelligence agent and return to his duties as the minister to Belgium.
 27  
 
Finally, Seward removed Sanford from the British intelligence network, directing him to 
focus his activities on continental Europe, where Sanford still was the Minister to 
Belgium, where he remained through the end of the war. 
Once the Confederacy had diplomats on the ground in Europe, it turned to another 
method of gaining European, and particularly British support – propaganda. From the 
war‘s outset, the Confederacy, and, to a smaller extent, the Union, made use of a small 
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number of native Britons, home-grown agents who usually worked independently of the 
Union and Confederate propagandists, both gathering information and disseminating it to 
the British population.
28
  As Britons, this group of men probably had the most knowledge 
concerning actual public sentiment towards the two combatants, and this made them 
important assets to the Union and Confederate agents.   
However, these home-grown agents were not enough for the Confederacy.  Soon 
after William Yancey, Pierre Rost, and Ambrose Dudley Mann had established 
themselves in early 1861, a second group was dispatched - the two propagandist agents, 
Henry Hotze and Edwin De Leon - who created newspapers and authored pamphlets in 
an attempt to reach large numbers of the British people.  Hotze was assigned to Great 
Britain whereas De Leon‘s post was France.29   
Henry Hotze was perhaps the Confederacy‘s best propagandist in Europe.  Hotze 
was born in Zurich, Switzerland, on September 2, 1834.  Hotze‘s father, Rudolph, was a 
captain in the French Royal Service, and his mother was named Sophie Esslinger, but 
little else is known about either of them.
30
  Likewise, little is known about Hotze‘s youth, 
beyond the fact that he received a strong Jesuit education and that he immigrated to 
Mobile, Alabama, in 1850 where he became a naturalized citizen on June 27, 1856.
31
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Hotze arrived in America with entrenched views about race and the origins of mankind, 
views that were intensified when he was asked to translate Essai sur L’inégalité des 
Races Humanies by Count Arthur de Gobineau.
32
  When Fort Sumter was fired upon and 
Davis asked for volunteers, Hotze enlisted in the Mobile Cadets.  He served in the 
Confederate army for three months, and then reported back to Richmond in late May or 
early June 1861 to meet with Leroy Pope Walker, the first Confederate Secretary of 
War.
33
  Hotze was a well-connected young man who persistently sought an officer‘s 
commission.  In the process, he contacted Colin J. McRae, an acquaintance who later 
became the chief financial agent for the Confederacy in Europe and who personally took 
Hotze‘s case to Walker and advocated for a diplomatic assignment for the young 
soldier.
34
  After no initial response, McRae thought that Walker was ignoring his 
recommendation and so petitioned Walker again, insisting that Hotze was a man with 
talents and skills that would be valuable in service to the Confederacy; hence, Hotze was 
discharged from the army and received the assignment that led him to become a 
propagandist.
35
  Hotze‘s task, as stated by Walker, was to communicate with Confederate 
agents already in Europe, and work with Huse to try to speed up the private purchase of 
war materials.
36
 
The first challenge for Hotze was to get to Europe.  Hotze was unable to leave the 
United States through the Union blockade, so he planned to journey to Canada through 
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Detroit, Michigan, and then travel across the ocean.  However, Hotze encountered delays 
in Indianapolis and Peru, Indiana, and then saw his plans further frustrated by a derailed 
train.
37
  As a result, Hotze abandoned his original plans and traveled instead through 
Buffalo, New York, to get to Canada where, upon his arrival, he was, ―tired, worried, and 
all out of patience.‖38  The delays were tiresome but he used them to practice the skills he 
would need later.  Using his formidable journalistic talents, Hotze, observed and then 
reported on the North‘s reactions to the war, such as the Union‘s overconfidence.  The 
reports were sent back to Richmond, thereby giving the South useful information.
39
   
Finally arriving in Britain on October 4, 1861, Hotze immediately met with his 
contacts. Soon he spotted two glaring weaknesses in the Confederacy‘s overseas strategy: 
the need for a much stronger Confederate presence in Britain; and the need for the 
increased use of propaganda.
40
  Hotze recognized the hold that the Northern press held 
over the British people, and he knew that the Confederacy‘s lack of an organized 
diplomatic department and propaganda machine was a severe handicap for the Southern 
cause.
41
  Hotze believed that Rost, Mann and Yancey were not experienced or 
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knowledgeable enough to deal with the political world of Great Britain.
42
  Furthermore, 
while many in the Confederacy sneered at diplomatic and propaganda efforts and were 
convinced that military success would yield European recognition, Hotze did not agree, 
noting that the Northern propaganda machine already had a head start on information 
dissemination, and the Confederacy needed to have a propaganda office in Britain to 
counter that.
43
   
Hotze‘s return to Richmond in late October 1861 culminated in his meeting with 
Judah Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of War.  In his report, he observed that the 
Confederacy was in desperate need of a full-time British propaganda agent and that he 
was an excellent candidate for the position.  Benjamin agreed with the younger man‘s 
assessment, for he understood that European intervention on behalf of the Confederacy 
was absolutely crucial.
44
  Benjamin, impressed with Hotze‘s insight, arranged a meeting 
with Secretary of State Robert M. Hunter, who agreed with Benjamin‘s assessment on the 
need for a propaganda machine.  As a result, Hunter appointed Hotze a Confederate 
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―Commercial Agent‖ to London, granting him the power to accomplish what he had told 
Benjamin needed to be done.
45
 
Hotze, now an officially appointed propagandist, was viewed with suspicion by 
the British government, whereas diplomats, as officially appointed representatives, were 
given at least the chance to be received by foreign governments.  Hotze and his Union 
counterpart, Thurlow Weed, did have governmental support and were considered 
government employees, but they, unlike their diplomatic counterparts, usually did not 
follow diplomatic protocol.
46
  They also were paid less than the official diplomats – 
Hotze‘s annual salary was a mere $1,500, a relatively unimportant sum not large enough 
to adequately cover his expenses while operating in Britain.
47
  John Slidell, who replaced 
Pierre Rost as the Confederate envoy to France, and the propagandist assigned to work 
with him, Edwin De Leon, both also received salaries that were larger than Hotze‘s.  In a 
letter dated April 12, 1862, Confederate Secretary Judah Benjamin gave Slidell and De 
Leon total credits of $25,000 for ―obtaining the insertion in public journals of Great 
Britain and the Continent [of] such articles as may be useful in enlightening public 
opinion.‖48  Although no official reason was given for the substantial difference in 
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monies between Hotze and the Slidell-De Leon partnership, it could have been due to 
Slidell‘s higher position as a diplomat.  As the war progressed, the available money 
decreased, as did the amount of resources and supplies that could be purchased, further 
impeding the propagandists‘ tasks.49   
 Hotze now began to construct a Confederate propaganda machine from the 
ground up, including a network of acquaintances and friends loyal to the Southern cause. 
First, Hotze set up The Index, a publication with the task to gain the support of the British 
people for the Confederacy by publishing statistics, stories, correspondence, politics, and 
news that were favorable to the Confederacy.  Hotze quickly realized that one major 
obstacle to gaining British support was British society itself, which was stratified and 
divided in such a manner that convincing more than one class of British society to 
simultaneously support the South was quite difficult.
50
  In fact, the topic of how class 
loyalties affected foreign policy in 1860s Britain has been the subject of much historical 
debate, with traditionalists heralding the view that the British aristocracy, the upper-
middle class and political conservatives were sympathetic towards the Confederacy, 
while the radicals, the lower-middle class and the working classes were pro-Union.
51
 This 
division was exacerbated by the fact that the government sometimes gave mixed signals, 
such as a statement issued by Lord John Russell in 1862 in which he suggested that the 
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―great majority [of the British government] are in favour of the South & nearly our whole 
people are of opinion that separation wd. be a benefit both to North & South.‖52  On the 
other hand, however, other members of the government gave different, and often opposite 
signals, such as the Conservative Party‘s leader, Lord Edward George Geoffrey Smith-
Stanley, 14
th
 Earl of Derby, who observed that the first public reaction from the British 
public was pro-Union.
53
  Derby later came under pressure from his numerous political 
friends to change his position, which he did, retracting his previous statement and instead 
noting that the British public supported the Confederacy.  This political game continued 
with other government officials such as  William Gladstone, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, commenting that Parliament, whose members were divided as much as the 
constituents they represented, opposed slavery but remained friendly toward the South.
54
   
These political rivalries were further inflamed by disagreements among the 
political statesmen as seen with Lords John Russell and Palmerston.  Palmerston, the 
British Prime Minister, was rumored to have dominated foreign policy during his reign, 
completely overshadowing Russell‘s accomplishments in the government.  Lord 
Russell‘s appointment to the Foreign Office was made without Palmerston‘s total 
support, for he preferred George Herbert Hyde Villiers, 4
th
 Earl of Clarendon.  Deprived 
of the position, Clarendon remarked that ―John Russell has neither policy nor principles 
of his own, and is in the hands of Palmerston, who is an artful old dodger,‖ clearly a vote 
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of no confidence in Russell‘s abilities.55  Other members of the government however, 
assumed that Russell‘s appointment was indeed Palmerston‘s doing, for Russell 
continued Palmerston‘s so-called ―age of foreign policy, often appearing to be 
Palmerston‘s puppet.‖56  However, this does not take into account Lord Russell‘s strong-
willed and unpredictable personality or his extensive background in foreign affairs.
57
  
This knowledge was especially evident during the Trent Affair of 1861 when both he and 
Palmerston demanded the release of Confederate commissioners Mason and Slidell.
58
  
The Conservative Party backed Russell and Palmerston‘s stand during that crisis as a 
matter of national interest since the incident was a violation of international maritime 
law.
59
  Despite the fact that Palmerston was Liberal while Russell was Conservative, they 
nonetheless formed a partnership that carried over to their work during the American 
Civil War, when the issue of intervention was key, and in which the British government 
was divided just as much as the other social classes. 
As mentioned, the upper-middle and middle classes of British society were 
supposedly more likely to support the Union rather than the Confederacy; however, 
caution must be taken in making a generalization such as this, for like Britain‘s elite, the 
                                                             
55 Paul H. Scherer, ―Partner or Puppet?  Lord John Russell at the Foreign Office, 1859-1863,‖ 
Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 19 (Autumn, 1987), 348. 
 
56 Ibid.  
 
57 Ibid., 351-352.  
 
58 James P. Baxter, 3rd, ―The British Government and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865,‖ The American 
Historical Review 34 (Oct., 1928), 15-16; Scherer, ―Partner or Puppet?,‖ 352; Steven Siegel, ―British 
Foreign Policy During the American Civil War: January 1860 to September 1862,‖ The Concord Review 
16, no. 1 (Fall 2005), 117-137, http://www.tcr.org/tcr/essays/ eprize07_Civil%20War% 
20Diplomacy%2016_1.pdf (accessed January 17, 2011), 122. 
 
59 Wilbur Jones, ―The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,‖ 530. 
 
 59 
middle classes were also divided in their loyalties.
60
  For example, merchants who sold 
supplies to both the Union and Confederacy made more money since the Union-
implemented blockade severely limited the Confederacy‘s access to foreign goods, 
making the British ability to market such supplies crucial.  The blockade allowed the 
Confederacy to claim belligerent status giving it the right to buy arms, equipment and 
ships overseas, and for the Confederacy, with its lack of a merchant marine and domestic 
manufacturing centers, such imports were crucial.
61
  As mentioned earlier, working 
through the firm of John Fraser & Company, the Confederacy set about quietly 
purchasing desperately needed weapons and supplies from private British firms   
On the other hand, mill owners and managers often supported the Union for 
several reasons, all economic.  First, both the managers and mill owners believed that if 
Great Britain decided to enter the American Civil War in support of the Confederacy, 
profits would be lost and global markets would be destabilized, both undesirable 
economic situations.
62
  Britain was making huge profits from the war, especially in 
munitions by selling to both sides.
63
  It was also seeing increasing profits in shipping, 
since Confederate cruisers and privateers were making it dangerous to ship goods on 
Union ships; therefore, Britain, being a neutral, picked up the slack.
64
  Second, some 
merchants imported wheat, and demand for wheat rose as the war continued, especially in 
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 60 
light of small British wheat crops in 1860-1862.
65
  As demand rose, so did prices, and 
Britain began importing more wheat from the United States.  Some in Britain were 
fearful that if Britain supported the Confederacy, British merchants would lose access to 
American wheat, creating a food crisis in Britain, and destroying their profits.
66
  
Unwilling to risk damage to their profit margins, many merchants believed that 
supporting the Union, not the Confederacy, was the wiser course.  However, many 
merchants and traders supported the Confederacy because a number of them were 
negatively impacted by the blockade.  One such group – the ―free traders‖ – owned or 
worked for businesses that traded with the Confederacy. The blockade had severely cut 
into their profits, and so these merchants were Confederate supporters.
67
   
Traditionalist historians commonly asserted that Union sympathy was rather 
prevalent in British society, and especially in the middle and working classes.  More 
recently, historians such as Mary Ellison and Douglas Lorimer challenged this idea, 
citing as evidence the people of Lancashire.  Ellison proposed that the British middle 
class supported the Confederacy for several reasons: first, support for the Confederacy 
seemed to be the quickest way to obtain raw cotton; second, they viewed the 
Emancipation Proclamation as somewhat hypocritical, since it still sanctioned slavery in 
the border states; third, many felt that a Confederate victory would eventually lead to the 
end of southern slavery, since many British believed that slavery was on its way out in 
the American South; and finally, many British believed that American southerners had a 
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fundamental right to choose their own form of government.
68
  Ellison also refuted the 
notion that the lack of agitation from the Lancashire workers signified support for the 
Union, and argued that it cannot be assumed that the workers were sympathetic towards 
the North.  Ellison argued that many wanted the South to win and gave the Confederacy 
their moral backing.  Ellison believed that the workers felt only mistrust for the Union, a 
feeling that deepened as the war progressed.
69
  
Lorimer sided with Ellison concerning the British public‘s loyalties during the 
war, thereby supporting that revisionist interpretation, but he delved more deeply into the 
intricacies of British society, particularly the political and social aspects that divided the 
populace.
70
  For example, like his colleague, Lorimer stated that large segments of the 
British populace supported the Confederacy‘s fight for independence while nursing a 
strong distrust of northern war aims, and even those workers in Lancashire who were 
rumored to have endorsed the Union in reality favored the Southern states, urging the 
British government to back the Confederacy.
71
  The workers‘ most pressing issue was 
more economic than moral, a point identified in traditional historiography.  Groups who 
shared the Lancashire workers‘ concerns urged the British government to move as 
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quickly as possible to help the Confederacy achieve its independence, firmly believing 
that if this was done, their economic situation would quickly improve.
72
   
In fact, a large number of mill workers were paying close attention to the 
American conflict.  By November 1862, an estimated 330,000 mill workers were 
unemployed in Britain.
73
  Every morning, crowds gathered in Liverpool waiting for the 
mail from the United States to arrive.  They hoped for news that there were incoming 
cotton shipments, or news that Britain was standing fast on, or conversely, setting aside, 
her neutrality.  Some feared that if Britain intervened on the side of the Confederacy, the 
Union would declare war on Great Britain.  A cotton spinner, John Ward from Clitheroe, 
commented on January 1, 1862, that the New Year was not beginning on a positive note, 
for thousands of mill workers had been laid off and others worried that their jobs would 
vanish in the next year, noting that, ―A war with America [would be the final straw] as 
we [Britain] will get no cotton.‖74  Now that British surplus cotton supplies were mostly 
consumed, finding enough cotton to keep its textile industry running became the British 
preoccupation.  Despite some small successes in establishing permanent alternate cotton 
sources, American cotton was still the most commonly imported cotton variant; however, 
by the beginning of 1862, as American cotton shipments became increasingly rare, Surat, 
or Indian cotton, although of poorer quality, was being imported more frequently.
75
  
Furthermore, spinning Surat cotton required fewer workers, which resulted in excess 
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numbers of available workers and lower wages for those still employed; however, for the 
owners, the money saved from paying less workers actually more than made up for the 
decreased profits from sales of the poorer quality products.
76
   
The mills provided little aid or support to their unemployed workers, and as the 
supply of raw cotton decreased, the number of unemployed workers increased.
77
  Since 
the blockade was seen as a major factor in the decrease in European cotton supplies, it 
was also seen as a factor in the subsequent cotton famine that the Confederacy had hoped 
for earlier in the war and that Britain had feared.  
Thus, by the end of 1862, one-fifth of the mill workers in Lancashire were on 
relief, while in other areas close to 40 percent of the population was being helped by 
charitable organizations due to unemployment.
78
 In addition, there were millions more 
who were on the verge of losing their jobs.  Both the Union and the Confederate 
propagandists attempted to sway the opinion of these workers, hoping that their 
desperation would lead them to throw their support to one side or the other. Hotze used 
his Index to appeal to these workers.  In the Index, Hotze published letters from shipping 
houses in New York and London indicating that private agents were scouring the globe 
for available cotton, since the Union blockade prevented any available Confederate 
cotton from reaching Britain, a fact that Hotze continually hammered home.
79
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Correspondents related that Southern planters would not send any cotton as long as the 
Union occupied port cities, and Hotze cleverly blamed the Union for the fact that the 
profit margins of the ―free traders‖ were suffering.80 Furthermore, Hotze was well-
informed about the falling stockpiles of cotton in Britain, reporting those numbers to the 
public whenever possible.  In an issue of the Index dated May 1, 1862, Hotze reported:  
          The stock of American cotton in Liverpool, 1st January, was 279,400 bales, of all  
          kinds 622,600.  Total import since, 320,755.  Stock of American, April 25th,  
          124,250.  Total, 398,890 bales.  The quantity afloat to arrive from Bombay [India]  
          is about 170,000 bales, or 50,000 less than at the corresponding period of 1861.   
          These figures show the total available supply in the port, 1st January, to 25th April,  
          to have been 953,000 bales.
81
   
 
Hotze used statistics to convince the British public of the danger of supporting the Union, 
using them to heighten British workers‘ fears of unemployment.  In this same article, 
Hotze also played on fears of social unrest, stating that a cotton famine would be 
disastrous for the British textile industry. He argued that the apathy of the British 
populace towards intervention on behalf of the Confederacy would dissipate as cotton 
stockpiles decreased.
82
  Hotze continued to play on fears of unemployment, publishing 
statistics on cotton stockpiles in every issue of the Index.  Hotze repeatedly emphasized 
the negative impact of the Union blockade on the British textile industry.  In an issue of 
the Index dated October 23, 1862, Hotze commented 
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          The great depression noted in my last report continued unabated on Thursday and  
          Friday, the sales each day reached barely a thousand bales, and a further decline of  
          1/2d. was submitted to in Surats. …In American cotton, scarcely any business has  
          been done in the last few days.  Yesterday no sales whatever were recorded, and to- 
          day only 100 bales; the price of Middling Orleans may be put nominally at 26d.
83
 
 
If Hotze‘s reports did not change minds, they must have reinforced some beliefs already 
held by some British workers. 
The divisions within the British elite drew Hotze‘s attention.  Hotze believed that 
the elite were typically divided along more political lines rather than by socioeconomic 
conditions.
84
  Hotze‘s investigations revealed a number of reasons why the British elite 
supported the South, among them a hatred of democracy and a desire to reassert 
aristocratic traditions.  Britain‘s elite opposed giving political power to the masses. Hotze 
was aware of this distaste for democracy, and he knew that in order to influence British 
opinion, he would have to work from the top down.  This meant starting with the elite, 
among whom the Conservatives tended to support the Confederacy, while the Liberals 
tended to support the Union and the democracy it represented.
85
  However, even within 
these two divisions, debates raged between those in favor of self-determination, 
nationalism or just those (usually government officials) who sympathized the 
Confederacy but were unwilling to grant recognition or intervene.  There were even some 
officials, such as the Second Earl of Granville, George Gower, the Lord President of the 
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Queen‘s Council, who in 1862 advocated mediation.86  Granville‘s caution was indicative 
of most members of the British Parliament, who waited to see which side was more likely 
to win. 
In Great Britain, anti-slavery feelings were a major obstacle for Hotze‘s 
propaganda machine.  Throughout Britain, publications advocated support for both sides; 
The Spectator editorialized its opinion on the slavery issue in 1862 by stating that ―all 
Englishmen now assume, that absolute subjugation of the South is a dream, that the war 
is a question of boundaries, – a question, as mathematicians would say, of the maximum 
or minimum extent of the slave power.‖87  Confederate sympathizers were concerned 
about the Spectator’s editorial, fearing that Britain‘s stance on slavery would affect her 
stand on the war.
88
  For United States Minister Charles Adams, that fear was very much 
evident in mid-1862 when Confederate diplomat James Mason petitioned the British 
government to formally recognize the Confederacy, and the fact that the petition was 
accepted without comment did nothing to quell Adams‘ fears.  Adams warned William 
Seward that if the Union was to stand a chance at convincing Britain to remain neutral, 
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then the moral argument of the war had to switch from preserving the Union to fighting 
against the evils of slavery.
89
   
Union and Confederate propagandists also found themselves facing British bias 
and perceptions of Americans from both the Union and the Confederacy.  These biases 
were fanned by outspoken British authors such as Sydney Smith and Fanny Trollope, 
who looked down upon the United States, declaring that the United States was ―militarily 
weak, politically corrupt, and financially unsound.‖90  One such writer, Charles Dickens, 
deeply upset Americans with his questions about whether America was a true republic. 
Basing his critique on what he experienced during his 1842 American visit, Dickens was 
upset by the refusal of the American people outside of abolitionist circles to discuss any 
topic related to slave revolts or to freeing slaves.  The concept that a topic was taboo just 
because a portion of the population was not comfortable discussing it did not fit Dickens‘ 
idea of a republic.
91
  Dickens‘ comments were hurtful to many Americans and may have 
worsened relations between the two nations.  Dickens‘ public criticism of the American 
people complicated an already complex set of beliefs about the American political 
situation at the war‘s onset. Another who insulted the Union was Edward Dicey, a 
correspondent for The Spectator and Macmillan’s Magazine, who commented that 
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Abraham Lincoln was an ill-mannered man, one that ―you would never say… was a 
gentleman.‖92   
British aristocrats feared that democracy in the United States might inspire British 
reformers, such as John Bright and Richard Cobden, to campaign for an enlarged 
franchise at home, and the London Times was particularly concerned about the possibility 
of domestic reforms.
93
  Thus, for the propagandists and diplomats alike, the opinions of 
British society were a crucial hurdle to overcome.  With the attack on Fort Sumter and 
the commencement of the war, the British eagerly awaited news of what would happen 
next.  One British magazine commented that the incident (Fort Sumter) was a 
justification of Britain‘s wisdom in choosing a ―solid political system,‖ effectively 
undermining the American government and its diplomatic powers.
94
  However, a lengthy 
war was not what the British expected; in fact, the British press had considered a 
Southern victory fait accompli, believing that the Union would choose to avoid conflict 
and amicably allow the Confederate states to secede.  British abolitionists and reformers 
like Bright and Cobden had also agreed that a ―quiet secession‖ was the best course for 
the Union to take since it would avoid years of bloodshed.  However, once the 
Confederates attacked Fort Sumter, that war the British believed would never happen, 
                                                             
92 As quoted in Mahin, One War at a Time, 28.  This comment captures some of the attitudes of 
the British populace in the months leading up to the outbreak of war.  Abraham Lincoln‘s election was not 
met with overwhelming support in Britain, but rather, many thought him ill-suited for the office of 
president 
 
93 Howard Jones, Blue & Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 32.  The London Times went on to say that the 
idea of obtaining more liberty for the British people was lunatic and was, in fact, a form of tyranny.  This 
comment supported the common conception among the British people that democracy as a form of 
government was not permanent and that the United States‘ failure to stay together was a prime example of 
the system‘s inability to function. 
 
94 Ibid., 33. 
 
 69 
was now a reality.  In 1861, few members of Parliament seemed to have been openly pro-
Confederate, and, according to Ellison, many of the working classes were actually pro-
Confederate.
95
   According to historian Howard Jones, by mid-1861 it seemed as if some 
members of the British government might be moving toward a decision concerning their 
stance in the American Civil War.  This was evident when Parliamentary member 
William H. Gregory announced his intention to present a motion for British recognition 
of the Confederacy, stating that both the war and the Morrill Tariff had convinced him 
that Britain had to pull back into her own orbit, putting her interests (particularly 
economic) first.  Gregory believed that if Britain supported the Confederacy in the 
conflict and the Confederacy won its independence, Britain would be in a better position 
to negotiate with the new nation for trade and economic benefits.  However, Gregory 
received little support for his motion, and the official policy of British neutrality 
continued.
96
  Fellow Parliamentary member William E. Forster responded to the failure 
of Gregory‘s motion with one of his own, stating that Britain would remain neutral in the 
war not only because it was the wisest political move at the time, but also because Britain 
had no wish to resume the African slave trade, an indication of Britain‘s abolitionist 
beliefs.
97
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Adams saw how Parliamentary debate affected the government, but also how 
divided the politicians were over what action to take.  The Confederate position was one 
of underdog and victim, but many politicians also believed it was Britain‘s humanitarian 
duty to end the bloodshed.  To counter that, Adams urged Seward to emphasize the 
Union‘s moral stance in the war.98  Adams knew that Mason‘s petition was controversial, 
and his thoughts were confirmed when Lord John Russell mentioned to Lord Richard 
Lyons, the British representative in Washington that the ensuing debate had surprised 
him.  In fact, Lord Russell had been astonished by the amount of passion present in 
Parliament in 1862, as the issue of intervention once again became a topic of interest.  
Lord Russell concluded that, ―The great majority are in favour of the South.‖99  Lord 
Russell‘s affirmation of the large amount of Confederate support in the British 
Parliament, when coupled with Lord Russell‘s personal views, further alarmed Adams.  
However, although Lord Russell admitted to favoring the restoration of the Union, he 
also stated that he was not sure of the war‘s outcome.100  In order to maintain a neutral 
stance, Lord Russell indicated that he would take the middle ground between the two 
American factions.  That infuriated Seward, for it meant that Britain‘s decision for or 
against neutrality might be based on the direction of the conflict itself.
101
  In 1862 the war 
was running in favor of the Confederacy, which had achieved major victories at the 
Second Battle of Bull Run and the Battle of Fredericksburg, and so this comment by Lord 
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Russell seemed to clearly imply that Britain would soon officially recognize the South 
and provide aid and possibly intervention.
102
 
Despite the Confederate victory at Fredericksburg, in December 1862, 
Confederate support in Britain began to decline due to a shift in the purpose of the Civil 
War.  Until the Battle of Antietam in September 1862, the North‘s purpose for fighting 
the war was to preserve the Union.  However, Lincoln, seizing upon the more or less 
victorious outcome of Antietam, issued a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on 
September 22, 1862, that freed the slaves in those areas in rebellion and that would 
become effective on January 1, 1863.  Now there was a new moral purpose behind the 
Union cause – the abolition of slavery, and this cause resonated with the British who had 
abolished slavery throughout the empire.   
Now Hotze and his fellow propagandists redoubled their efforts to gain British 
support.  As early as 1862, Hotze published correspondence from a New Yorker who 
agreed with a brochure written by Edwin De Leon, the Confederate propagandist in 
France.  In this brochure, titled La Vérité sur les États Confederès d’Amérique, De Leon 
offered several arguments supporting the continuation of slavery.  Hotze utilized this 
correspondence as propaganda to show the British public that slavery was not a cruel 
institution, but instead one that protected happy, contented Negroes.  Hotze continued to 
use De Leon‘s brochure as evidence that the institution of slavery in the Confederacy was 
a blessing for African Americans, not a curse.
103
  One popular quotation used in various 
media for propaganda purposes came from De Leon‘s brochure: “Le noir… preférera 
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l’état des choses auxquelles il a été habitué, ce qui lui a permis d’atteindre un âge… de 
la tranquillité et des jouissances matérielles,” which represented a common Southern 
argument that the blacks were perfectly content with their lives.
104
  To this argument, De 
Leon added that the character of the Confederacy‘s ―peculiar institution‖ allowed the 
Southern states to send all of its white males off to war without damaging her agrarian 
economy because there were thousands of black workers, still available to farm and run 
the plantations.
105
  De Leon and Hotze were both aware of the negative reputation of 
slavery in Europe, particularly in Britain and France, and so De Leon attempted to 
downplay that by using the phrase ―peculiar institution‖ to build a more positive image of 
slavery.
106
 
Hotze‘s Index continued to report on the American conflict as well as events in 
Europe, adding increased calls for the British to recognize that slavery was not evil or 
immoral.  Hotze had long supported the idea of the inferiority of non-white races.  
Beginning with his translation of Gobineau‘s Essai, Hotze had been an early convert to 
the idea of racial anthropology as the underlying factor of racial inequality.
107
 In various 
writings, Hotze implied that blacks were meant to be the servants of the white race, since 
he said that they were made by God to be intellectually inferior.  However, although he 
made many statements about racial inequality and the virtues of southern slavery, it was 
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not until 1864, in an article titled, ―Abolitionism and the Negro,‖ that Hotze stated in 
clear, precise terms his opinion: ―[Negroes are] intellectually inferior to white people… 
[but] are nevertheless men—men who, as the institution of negro slavery in the South 
shows… are capable of social progress… are happy, and who above all else have 
aspirations for immortality.‖108 
Hotze also attempted to interpret historical facts to his advantage.  In the same 
article, Hotze argued that the profits from the slave trade had actually helped the Union 
become great; specifically, he mused that ―[the slave trade] raised New York to the rank 
of an Empire city, and lined her streets with marble palaces… [and] the profits realised 
from dealing in the products of negro labour… laid the foundation of the greatness of 
Boston.‖109  With this comment, Hotze attacked the validity of the Union‘s claims that 
slave labor was less productive than free labor, because enslaved blacks had directly 
contributed to the growth of wealthy urban centers such as Boston and New York.  Hotze 
continued his propagandist tactics by stating that slavery was not the catalyst behind the 
dissolution of the United States or a moral evil; it was simply a way of life that had 
helped both the North and the South become successful.
110
 
Union propagandists and agents were also active in Britain during the early years 
of the war.  Like their Confederate counterparts, the Union commissioners were sent to 
Europe with the goal of gaining British support for the war – specifically, to keep Britain 
from recognizing and aiding the Confederacy by persuading it to remain neutral.  
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Secretary of State William Seward was concerned that foreign governments might view 
the South‘s actions as justifiable.  The South‘s persistence in framing the conflict in terms 
of Confederate independence was designed to appeal to those with more liberal 
convictions, and the Union was determined to convince Europe, and particularly Britain, 
that the conflict was not a justifiable fight for Confederate independence but instead an 
illegal attempt to destroy the Union.
111
  Seward ignored warnings from his own consuls 
and diplomats such as Henry Sanford that he was not taking advantage of the collective 
goodwill and sympathy available to the Union during the early stages of the conflict, 
spurning such sympathy as worthless.  Seward even commented in a letter to John 
Bigelow, the new American consul in Paris, that ―foreign sympathy… never did and 
never can create or maintain any state.‖112   
However, Seward‘s attitude drastically changed upon receiving confirmation that 
the Confederacy had decided to send another group of emissaries to Europe: former 
United States Senators James Mason and John Slidell.  Their assignment led to two 
crises: one external and the other internal.  The first was the Trent Affair, an incident that 
involved Mason and Slidell being taken into custody in international waters on a ship 
registered to Great Britain.  This incident created a diplomatic crisis that the Confederacy 
hoped to use to garner British support. Furthermore, Seward and President Lincoln were 
concerned about the Confederacy‘s proactive approach in sending additional emissaries 
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abroad.  This led Seward to hastily assemble a team of commissioners to travel to Europe 
to intercede on behalf of the Union and counteract the Mason-Slidell mission.
113
 
Thurlow Weed, both a close friend to Seward and his campaign manager during 
the 1860 election, was particularly interested in this hand-picked commission.
114
  Seward 
chose four men as Union commissioners: Edward Everett, John P. Kennedy, John 
Hughes and Charles McIlvaine.  However, only McIlvaine and Hughes accepted.
115
  
Everett, a former United States Secretary of State and a Senator from Massachusetts, 
refused to take on an unofficial position overseas when he had previously been the 
American ambassador to Great Britain, and Kennedy did not want to leave his business 
without the chance of compensation.
116
  Seward was embarrassed when Everett and 
Kennedy turned down the mission. The remaining candidates also had doubts concerning 
their appointments, but it was in John Hughes, the Catholic Archbishop of New York, 
that Weed took a peculiar interest, relating in his memoirs their conversation at a dinner 
party hosted by Seward.  Hughes told Weed at that dinner that he had declined Seward‘s 
offer; luckily for him, the former campaign manager Weed had a solution to the 
problem.
117
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The ever-persistent Weed took up Seward‘s cause, stressing that it was 
Archbishop Hughes‘s obligation as a ―loyal citizen, devoted to the Union, and capable of 
rendering great service‖ to accept Seward‘s offer, and he used Hughes‘ Irish birth as an 
additional reason why Archbishop Hughes should accept Seward‘s offer.  Weed‘s 
persistence paid off:  Archbishop Hughes agreed to take Seward up on his offer, with the 
condition that Weed must accompany him overseas.
118
  Weed reluctantly agreed, 
commenting that he could not think of a reason to turn Weed down.
119
   
Seward finally had his representatives.  The final list included: General Winfield 
Scott, a Mexican-American war hero and author of the Anaconda plan that included a 
Union blockade of the Confederacy; Archbishop Hughes, who would ultimately battle 
with Confederate John Slidell for France‘s sympathy; McIlvaine, who would woo and 
gain the Anglican clergy‘s support; and Weed, whose past as Seward‘s wily campaign 
manager made him an ideal match for James Mason.
120
  
Not everyone approved of Seward‘s choices.  William Russell, reporter for the 
London Times, commented that while Weed‘s skills as a political lobbyist were 
admirable, they did not necessarily make him a good match for Mason.  Russell wrote to 
a fellow war correspondent in New York that while Weed‘s slyness was an admirable 
trait, ―he will be of small weight among the polished politicians of France or England.‖121  
Another who disapproved of Seward‘s choices was Charles Francis Adams, who 
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commented that Hughes, McIlvaine and Weed seemed ―to [be to] me of no value.‖122  
Weed in turn, rebutted Adams, commenting upon his arrival at the United States Legation 
in London that he should have arrived earlier, for he viewed Adams‘ alarmed state and 
paranoia as making it more difficult than it already was to effectively gain public 
support.
123
   
In terms of propaganda, Hotze mentioned in a letter dated September 1862, to 
Judah Benjamin, that he believed himself capable of overcoming the Union‘s own 
propaganda machine.
124
  That may have been the case, but effectiveness rested not just on 
people, but also on process.  While both Union and Confederate agents gathered 
information, they disseminated it somewhat differently.  The Union‘s diplomatic base in 
Britain was much stronger than the Confederacy‘s, but the Union did not have a 
mouthpiece on the level of The Index. Union diplomats, however, regularly used 
established media forms such as newspapers to woo the British public.  But often the 
American representatives themselves were left out of the propaganda loop.  For example, 
the backlash from the Trent Affair ensured that the Union diplomatic representative, 
Charles Francis Adams, was not only furious, but humiliated that his overall knowledge 
of the affair was no better than what the general public gleaned from The Times.
125
  This 
situation, when coupled with Adams‘ failure to procure valuable information, contributed 
to the difficult task of gaining public support for the Union.  Benjamin Moran, the 
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Assistant Secretary at the United States Legation in London, commented on the difficulty 
of gaining British support when he chanced to look out a window and saw that the 
American owners of the Adelphi Theatre had added the Confederate flag alongside the 
Union‘s Stars and Stripes.  This action was a symbol of the split in sympathies among 
both American residents and native Britons, but it could also have been a wise business 
decision designed to attract clientele from both sides.
126
   
If sympathies in London were divided, they were also divided in other major 
British towns; for example, in Liverpool, where the new Union consul, Thomas Haines 
Dudley, began laying the groundwork for his intelligence network.  Dudley‘s arrival in 
Liverpool coincided with the Trent Affair, and his duties were threefold: building an 
intelligence network; continuing his official business as a consul; and engaging in a 
propaganda war with the Confederacy.
127
  Moran, upon meeting Dudley, remarked that 
―he is as intelligent as he looks and talks with great force…. I was much gratified to find 
him a strenuous patriot.  He is modest, refined and able and would make a splendid 
European representative.‖128  Moran‘s approval matched that of Adams, for he regarded 
the Liverpool consul as a peer equipped to handle the tenuous situation in Europe.  
Dudley proved his worth early in the game for he soon reported to Adams and Moran that 
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Southern expatriates in Liverpool were capitalizing on the Trent Affair in an attempt to 
gain support for the Confederacy.
129
   
Upon arriving in London, Dudley was invited to a banquet in honor of John 
Bright, a radical Member of Parliament who was an antislavery activist and with a strong 
record of friendship with the Union.  This was the beginning of a firm relationship 
between the two men. Bright remarked, in a letter written to Dudley on December 9, 
1861, that ―there are two nations in England, the governing class and the millions who 
toil, the former dislike your Republic and their organs incessantly misrepresent and 
slander it,‖ correctly implying that British society was not unified in its opinion on the 
American conflict; rather, the existing divisions prevented unanimity concerning what 
actions the British government should take.
130
   
Adams and Dudley dealt daily with assertions that the anti-Union hostility already 
present in British society was expanding and could influence the government.  This fear 
motivated Union efforts to sway public sentiment towards support for British neutrality.  
Both men knew that Union efforts needed to be intensified after word spread in 1862 
about General Benjamin Butler‘s disastrous General Order No. 28 concerning the 
treatment of certain women in captured New Orleans.  Butler‘s threat to treat those 
women who insulted his troops as prostitutes outraged and simultaneously offended the 
British elite who termed the law ―barbaric and outrageous.‖131  Prime Minister Lord 
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Palmerston publicly denounced Butler‘s actions in a speech to the House of Commons in 
June 1862, in which he expressed his disappointment and disgust.
132
   
Palmerston‘s ministry, much like the British public, was split on the issue of 
intervention.  Hotze‘s preliminary observations revealed that among those supporting the 
Union were a handful of extremely powerful men such as Lord John Russell in the House 
of Lords; however, in the House of Commons there was not strong support, and in both 
houses, there was little action on matters involving aid to the Confederacy.
133
 One 
powerful member who supported the Confederate cause, William S. Lindsay, remarked 
that he hoped the Civil War would be the end of American greatness, while Union 
supporter William Forster argued that British neutrality benefitted the Union.
134
  Because 
the government was precariously balanced, the Prime Minister knew that one wrong 
move on his part could bring down the fragile coalition and force new elections that had 
the potential to destabilize the government at a time when global and domestic conflicts 
were of great concern.
135
  This view was expressed in a public address printed in the 
London Gazette: ―Her Majesty… has seen no reason to depart from the neutrality to 
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which she has steadily adhered.‖136  This and other government-sponsored messages 
made the propagandists‘ job more difficult.  Therefore, Hotze worked closely with 
Confederate Commissioner James Mason to try to convince the British government to 
support the Confederacy.  Both used intelligence gathered from the British populace to 
pressure the British government.
137
  Adams and Dudley also gathered intelligence to 
counter Confederate publications and, in Adams‘ case, to try to convince Lords Russell 
and Palmerston to support British neutrality.
138
  It is interesting to note that throughout 
the war the British press continually emphasized Britain‘s positive stance on neutrality so 
as to not upset any one segment of the population or government.
139
   
As the war continued, the Confederacy grew increasingly concerned that the 
British government stubbornly remained neutral, a choice that implied support for the 
Union.  With the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, the worst fears of the 
Confederacy were realized – the war was now viewed in Britain as a moral conflict over 
slavery – and the Union was in a stronger position to pressure the British to remain 
neutral. Hotze worked against abolitionist sentiments to sway public opinion in favor of 
the Confederacy, at one point writing to M. T. Hunter that the ―vast majority of the 
British public . . . are now anxious to do something to strengthen us. . .‖140  Despite this 
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optimism, due to the divisions within British society concerning neutrality, Hotze‘s 
attempts to convince people to support the Confederacy were generally unsuccessful.  
Even though Hotze, in correspondence with Benjamin, at times exaggerated his success 
in changing public opinion, the fact remained that since the issuance of Lincoln‘s 
preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in 1862, there had been a shift in public opinion 
concerning the South.
141
  As Hotze attempted to downplay the issue of slavery, Thurlow 
Weed countered Hotze‘s actions in his meetings with high officials in both the British 
and French governments, by playing up the Union‘s strengths and the strong economic 
partnership that had existed between the United States and Britain since before the 
American Revolution.
142
   
In comparing the propaganda efforts of Union and Confederate representatives, a 
few key differences appear.  One was that the Confederate propaganda machine was 
aimed at the general population of Britain – particularly after the creation of The Index – 
whereas the Union seemed to focus more on the British government, working from the 
top down.  This did not mean, however, that the Confederacy neglected government 
officials, for as already mentioned, Hotze was particularly adamant about appealing to 
them based on touted similarities between Southern planters and the British elite.
143
  In a 
December 27, 1861, letter to Seward, Weed related how, during the Trent affair, he had 
commenced his own attack on the European public: ―we [the Union] have access to 
several journals, for which we have one very able writer, Torrens McCulloch, and two 
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143 Milton, Lincoln’s Spymaster, 66. 
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subordinates.‖144  In a move echoing what Hotze had done prior to receiving Judah 
Benjamin‘s permission to create The Index, Weed convinced a handful of writers to 
publish articles in favor of the Union in their own journals.  Compared to Hotze‘s 
strategies, this was more of a ―sharpshooter‖ tactic, using carefully selected journals and 
papers to spread pro-Union propaganda rather than a more widespread use of the media 
to appeal to various segments of the population.  The effectiveness of propaganda in 
swaying British opinion, particularly when the issue of the construction of Confederate 
ships in British shipyards appeared, will be investigated in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: 1862: The Apex of Confederate Efforts in Britain 
Throughout 1862 the Confederate need for British support moved beyond the use 
of propaganda machines such as The Index to sway British popular opinion to pressure 
politicians.  The Confederacy, which had been secretly purchasing supplies and weapons 
from British firms, became bolder as it commissioned the construction of ships in British 
shipyards.  Incensed, the Union found itself not only countering the Confederate 
propaganda machines, but also trying to prevent the growing sale of arms and supplies to 
Confederacy.  Both sides redoubled their diplomatic and propaganda efforts – which 
included disinformation and deceit – aimed at the British government and people.  
As already mentioned, Hotze‘s use of The Index to publish anti-Union articles had 
some success among the working classes, but not so much among the elite.  While there 
were some high officials who supported the Confederacy, the majority seemed content to 
remain neutral, unwilling to commit themselves to the support of a combatant that might 
not be victorious.  Despite the increasingly severe shortage of raw cotton, the moral issue 
of slavery seemed to play a larger role in this determination to remain neutral, and the 
fact that British firms and merchants were making huge profits selling supplies to both 
sides reinforced the benefits of neutrality. 
By October 1862, the British government was basically determined to remain 
neutral, and Hotze realized that his Index was not doing enough to influence British 
decision makers, and he began working closely with Confederate diplomat James Mason 
to convince the British government to intervene on behalf of the Confederacy.  Hotze and 
Mason, however, continued to reach out to the British people through The Index, as well 
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as through existing British media such as newspapers.
1
  In addition to his use of the 
media, Hotze began assisting British-born Confederate sympathizers in organizing public 
rallies and gatherings to gain public support.  Hotze knew that having a base of native 
support was crucial, because British Members of Parliament had to listen to their 
constituents if they wished to be re-elected.
2
   In this way, Hotze hoped to pressure the 
members of Parliament who had thus far resisted his attempts to change their minds. 
Therefore, Hotze set aside one thousand pounds to fund public rallies in the areas 
hardest-hit by economic difficulties, usually areas with a large unemployed population, in 
hopes that their voices would pressure the British government.
3
  Hotze hoped the rallies 
would aid him in spreading propaganda and influencing government officials, but they 
apparently resulted in no major gains for the Confederacy.
4
 
Hotze increasingly aimed his propaganda toward the elite and the top members of 
the British government, and his efforts were rewarded when he found an ally in William 
Lindsay.  Lindsay was a Member of Parliament and was intimately acquainted with 
Prime Minister Palmerston, Foreign Secretary Russell and most, if not all, of the other 
high government leaders.  Now, Hotze had an inside source for valuable information.
5
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Lindsay was eager to help the South win, for he was a self-made shipping magnate and 
foresaw future profits in a Confederate victory; however, he did not support the retention 
of the institution of slavery.
6
  Lindsay seized any available opportunity to ensure 
Southern success, going so far as to gain an audience with Emperor Napoleon III of 
France in 1862 to urge French intervention on the side of the Confederacy.  Writing to 
Mason after his interview, he said, ―I now have positive and authentic evidence that 
France only waits the assent of England for recognition [of the South] and other more 
cogent measures.‖7  Hotze and other Confederate supporters were elated by Lindsay‘s 
news and hoped that British recognition of the Confederacy was imminent.   
Hotze‘s network of collaborators continued to expand when Lindsay and native-
born James Spence began working together.  Spence was a Liverpool merchant who 
became a financial agent for Richmond and lecturer for various pro-Confederate 
organizations, and he aided Hotze by setting up public meetings and rallies in which he 
tackled the question of slavery.
8
  Spence argued at length in his book, The American 
Union (1861), for the independence of the American South.  Spence stated that the Union 
was not fighting for the abolition of slavery, and that an independent South would be 
forced to improve the lives of its slaves.
9
  In this book, Spence advocated a gradual 
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abolition of slavery in the Confederacy, and argued that such an action would naturally 
occur following the end of the war, for slavery was an ―outdated system of labour neither 
morally nor economically viable in the civilized nineteenth century.‖10  The Saturday 
Review, in a positive review of Spence‘s work, predicted that he would be quite 
successful, in part because he did not antagonize abolitionist sentiments and dealt with 
the subject of slavery in a logical manner, and he did not advocate social unrest.
11
 
Hotze‘s The Index pounced on Spence‘s work and reported on it in the June 5, 
1862, issue, remarking that Spence‘s research on the ―causes of the dissolution of the 
American Union, with such a profound knowledge of the true character of the American 
Constitution and laws‖ was so well done that it was hard to understand why the British 
government still hesitated to recognize the Confederacy.
12
  Hotze‘s praise for his fellow 
propagandist did not stop there, for he later reported on a meeting of the Southern Club, 
held in Liverpool on October 9, 1862, where Spence presided.
13
  Organizations such as 
the Southern Club adopted Spence‘s views that British recognition of an independent 
Confederacy would be the best support possible for the Southern states, and might 
encourage gradual and responsible emancipation of slaves. Hotze continued to tread 
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lightly on the issue of slavery, recognizing its volatility among the British populace.  He 
indicated to his readers, however, that the Confederacy was more than willing to listen to 
the abolitionist promptings of its friends, a message that he hoped would reassure enough 
Britons so that no segment of the British public would feel alienated.
14
 
Many of the same approaches used by Hotze were also used by the Union to 
gather information and disseminate propaganda.  The Union especially relied on word-of-
mouth for intelligence gathering when its agents attempted to gather information on 
Confederate shipbuilding as well as their purchase of other arms, munitions and supplies.  
Although concerned about the Confederate purchases, Northern agents were confident 
that growing British support for neutrality made the possibility of intervention unlikely.
15
  
The Union believed that it had the ear of the British government, an opinion clearly held 
by Thurlow Weed when he related how, upon his arrival in Britain, he broke 
          through all the usual forms of diplomacy… [and] I was tendered an audience by 
          Earl Russell… and subsequently was received by the Duke of Argyll, Milnor, 
          Gibson, Count de Morny, and other distinguished officials in London and Paris,  
          as a representative of my country, without ever having an opportunity… of  
          presenting my letters of instruction.
16
 
 
In this diary entry Weed seemed arrogant and satisfied.  Furthermore, he noted that he 
was able to meet with Earl Russell and a number of high-ranking British officials without 
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having to go through official channels as Adams and Mason had done.
17
  Nonetheless, 
Union agents watched Hotze‘s reports closely, knowing that the Confederate promoters 
and the anti-Union propaganda were having some impact on British opinion.
18
  
Furthermore, about the same time as Weed‘s arrival in Europe, the Union agent and spy, 
William M. Walker, U.S.N. reported to his chief, William Seward, on October 20, 1861, 
that there was a swarm of ―southern gentlemen,‖ who had entrée to British and French 
society and ―were rapidly bringing the upper classes and the educated under their 
influence.‖19  Furthermore, some of these ―gentlemen‖ were making purchases and 
shipments while using the press to spread their ―views and opinions‖ in the different 
circles in which they moved.
20
  Walker urged that some northern ―gentlemen‖ with good 
manners should be sent over immediately to counteract the ―southern gentlemen.‖21  The 
Union apparently ignored this suggestion, for no ―northern gentlemen‖ ever arrived.  
 Freeman Harlow Morse, the American consul to London, took over Sanford‘s 
network once Sanford was sent back to Belgium in late 1861, and he hired British 
detectives to gather information, hoping that the daily reports he received would include a 
key piece of intelligence that he could utilize to sabotage Confederate efforts in Europe.
22
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Morse also bribed postal workers to obtain the addresses of Confederate agents, giving 
him the opportunity to intercept pieces of mail and telegrams.
23
  Morse, like his 
predecessor Sanford, successfully obtained crucial information on the shipments of goods 
to the Confederacy, playing the role of spy rather than propagandist.
24
  In a dispatch to 
Seward dated November 28, 1862, Morse confirmed that the Confederacy was indeed 
shipping supplies to rebel ports under the British flag and had plans to carry on trade 
through the ports of Texas and Matamoras, Mexico.
25
  Morse‘s usage of his intelligence 
network was the work of a spy, and his attempts to halt the Confederate supply ships 
were tactics intended to produce long-term suffering and put pressure on the Southern 
states.
26
  
The Union was especially concerned about Confederate attempts to purchase or 
build ships for the Confederate navy, and that concern skyrocketed when Confederate 
James Dunwoody Bulloch arrived in Liverpool on June 4, 1861.
27
  The Confederacy was 
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not equipped with a large number of naval yards, and she needed ships.  Therefore, in 
order to create a navy, the Confederacy negotiated contracts with a number of European 
shipyards for the construction of powerful naval vessels.
28
  On May 9, 1861, Confederate 
Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory ordered Bulloch to travel to Great Britain and 
purchase ships capable of preying on Union trade vessels and possibly breaking the 
blockade.
29
  Bulloch was given one million dollars and allocated more credit to purchase 
two ironclad ships in Europe. Bulloch arrived in London with orders from Mallory to 
purchase ―six armed steam cruisers, equally capable of destroying United States 
commercial shipping on the high seas and engaging blockade ships along the Southern 
coast.‖30  Bulloch arrived in Britain seeking to purchase or construct six armed steam 
cruisers, as well as arrange for the construction of ironclad ships.
31
   
Union agents Sanford, Morse, and Ambassador Adams were quite concerned over 
Bulloch‘s presence in Europe, with Adams labeling him as ―the most dangerous man the 
South can have here and fully up to his business…. So dangerous do I consider this man 
that I feel disposed when he comes to the continent, to have him arrested on some charge 
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or other.‖32  Even though Sanford was not active in Britain after 1861, he, too, knew the 
danger that Bulloch posed to the Union.  In a preemptive strike, Sanford bought all the 
weapons and saltpeter he could in continental Europe to prevent Southern sympathizers 
from purchasing them for the secessionist cause.
33
   
  Bulloch, in turn, was cautious in searching for willing shipbuilders, particularly 
because of the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819.  This act forbade the ―equipping, 
furnishing, fitting out, or arming‖ in British territory of any naval vessel with the intent of 
using it against a belligerent nation; Confederate plans to use the ships against the Union 
clearly violated this law.
34
  Bulloch‘s Liverpool solicitor, however, interpreted the act as 
not prohibiting the construction of any ship, but merely forbidding the arming of a ship 
inside Britain‘s dominion with the intent to use it against a friendly state.35  Though not a 
propagandist himself, Bulloch‘s use of the loophole showed his willingness to misinform 
his enemies about his actions.  In this case, Bulloch used disinformation and deceit to 
hide his actions from Union agents, which included funding the ships‘ construction under 
false identities and having the shipyards begin building them. 
Bulloch‘s first acquisitions were raiders and blockade runners.  Shortly before 
Bulloch‘s arrival in Britain, a former U.S. Navy officer, Raphael Semmes, acting on 
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behalf of the Confederacy, had purchased and converted a steam packet called the 
Havana into a fighting ship ―armed with a massive 8-inch pivot gun and four 32-
pounders.‖36  On the Havanna, renamed the Sumter, Semmes prepared to go to sea and 
begin his campaign against the Union, but several Federal warships arrived to prevent the 
Sumter‘s departure.  Semmes managed to escape from the small Federal fleet, including 
the fifth largest warship in the Union Navy, the Brooklyn, by utilizing the small size of 
the Sumter to his advantage.
37
  The Sumter escaped a Federal patrol once again in 
Martinique and went on to capture a total of eighteen Union ships, burning three of them.  
The Union knew that although it was small, the Sumter’s presence did more harm than 
just the physical capture of ships, for it caused a number of Union ships to remain in port, 
leave on smaller and less profitable voyages, or sometimes fly foreign flags in an attempt 
to elude that ship and other Confederate vessels.
38
 
Soon after his arrival in Britain, Bulloch purchased a private ship, the Fingal, a 
propeller-driven vessel of relatively new construction that, while on a test run, clocked in 
at thirteen knots under steam, a speed high enough that Bulloch thought it had potential to 
become a blockade-runner.
39
  Taking possession of the vessel in Greenock, Scotland, 
Bulloch noted that ―it was necessary to act with caution and secrecy, because the 
impression got abroad that the Confederate Government was trying to fit out ships in 
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England to cruise against American commerce and… all vessels were closely watched.‖40  
Nonetheless, Bulloch procured the Fingal, had her loaded with critical military and naval 
supplies destined for the Confederacy.
41
  Bulloch obtained legal documentation from the 
Board of Trade stating that the ship was free to depart for either Bermuda or Nassau, with 
a small crew of sailors and engineers.  No mention was made of the ship‘s cargo.42  
However, Henry Sanford‘s intelligence network discovered that the Fingal was set to 
depart from Greenock with munitions for the Confederacy.
43
  One of Pollaky‘s men 
discovered that the Fingal was soon to set sail and reported:  
          after cruising unmolested amongst ‗an immense assortment of multifarious  
          goods‘—I fortunately observed the cases [.] there is no mistake about them as in  
          addition to the marks… they also have a card on each Isaac Campbell & Co. they  
          are remaining on the platform ready for delivery, depend upon it I will keep a  
          bright look out on them.
44
 
 
Brennan, one of Pollaky‘s men, reported the hourly movements surrounding the Fingal to 
Pollaky, who in turn gave the reports to Sanford, but the observations failed to make any 
mention of Bulloch or his crew actually boarding the ship.
45
  Bulloch, fearful of detection 
and detention by British customs, and knowing that his movements were being closely 
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watched, moved up the time of the Fingal‘s departure.46  Meanwhile, Bulloch slipped 
down the coast and boarded the Fingal at a different harbor, accomplishing an escape.
47
  
When Bulloch and the Fingal arrived safely in Bermuda, he received a dispatch 
from Stephen Mallory, the Confederate Secretary of the Navy.  Mallory congratulated 
Bulloch on his acquisition of the Fingal, approved the contracts for the building of two 
warships that would become the Florida and Alabama, and approved Bulloch‘s plan to 
captain the Fingal through the Union blockade and back to the Confederacy with her 
supplies.
48
  Bulloch eluded the Union blockade and sailed the Fingal up the Savannah 
River, where the Union‘s larger ships were unable to follow.  The Confederacy got its 
supplies, but the Federal blockade prevented the Fingal from resuming her service as a 
supply transport or raider.  She was later converted into an ironclad and renamed the 
Atlanta, but was captured by Federal troops in June, 1863.
49
  
While the Sumter and the Fingal were helpful, it was clear a tougher ship was 
needed: a warship.  Earlier, after his arrival in Liverpool, Bulloch began to quietly search 
for a naval yard amenable to the Confederacy. By August 1861, Bulloch had £131,000 to 
begin purchasing or subsidizing the construction of Confederate ships; soon he had 
contracts for the construction of two vessels: the Oreto and ship 290.
50
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The first true warship constructed for the Confederacy was the Oreto, later 
rechristened the Florida, built at the William C. Miller and Sons shipyard in Liverpool.
51
  
Adams found out about the Oreto‘s construction and sent Dudley to investigate further.   
Dudley uncovered Bulloch‘s secret shipbuilding program in the early months of 1862, 
discovering that the ships were funded by the British firm Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company, the same firm that bankrolled the majority of Confederate purchases 
throughout the war.
52
  On February 3, 1862, Dudley reported to the Union‘s State 
Department what he had uncovered concerning the Oreto: 
          The builders [at the Liverpool shipyard] say she is intended for the Italian  
          Government.  Fawcett Preston & Co. are fitting her out, supplying all the  
          machinery, etc.  From this fact and some other suspicious circumstances I am  
          afraid she is intended for the South.  She has one funnel, three masts, bark rigged,   
          eight port holes on each side and is to carry sixteen guns.  Her coal is now being  
          put on board and she will go to sea most likely the latter part of the week.  Her  
          armament is not as yet on board and the appearances indicate that she is to leave  
          Liverpool and receive (armaments) at some other place.
53
 
 
Dudley contacted the Italian Embassy, where the Italian professed ignorance that 
his government had funded the construction of a ship; Charles Francis Adams saw this as 
additional confirmation that the Confederacy was attempting to slip ships out of Britain 
for use against the Union.
54
  Construction on the Oreto was finished in February 1862, so 
Dudley and Adams launched an immediate campaign to stop the ship from sailing.  The 
two men discovered evidence of arms shipments sent from Liverpool to islands along the 
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West African coast, where they were then shipped to the Confederacy – one way of 
working around the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819.
55
  They presented this 
evidence to the British government, to no avail.  One of Dudley‘s major successes 
concerning the Oreto incident was the discovery that Bulloch was the Confederate agent 
in charge of obtaining ships.  When Dudley destroyed his cover, Bulloch became 
emboldened, as when he commanded the Oreto when she was launched (although, he 
then turned control over to Captain James Duguid).
56
  Bulloch spoke of Dudley in his 
memoirs as being in a ―wakeful and agitated condition during the remainder of the war‖ 
once he discovered the Confederate successes in circumventing the British Foreign 
Enlistment Act.
57
 
Adams turned over the information that he and Dudley had gathered on the Oreto 
to the Foreign Office in March 1862, which in turn sent customs officers to inspect the 
ship.  The lack of arms on the ship led the officials to conclude that the Oreto was not a 
warship; therefore, there was no cause for denying her launch.
58
  Infuriated by the news, 
both Adams and Dudley attempted to take their information and pleas to Lord Russell, 
but the foreign secretary had left London, and this allowed Bulloch to sail the Oreto out 
of Liverpool on March 22, 1862.
59
  The Oreto sailed to Nassau in the West Indies where 
the ship was armed and renamed the Florida.
60
  Bulloch‘s gamble was a success.  On the 
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other hand, the Florida was seized at Nassau in the summer of 1862, under the suspicion 
that she was waiting to be armed, news that pleased Secretary of State William Seward 
immensely.
61
  Unfortunately, there was not enough evidence to hold the ship and so the 
Florida was released.  Hotze used this and subsequent victories of the Florida as 
propaganda, reporting in his Index that 
          a mob of discharged sailors and others were employed to transship cargo from a  
          schooner into the Oreto.  I am credibly informed that about half an hour after they  
          got on board the Oreto she put to sea, and in about three hours afterwards overtook  
          the British schooner Prince Alfred, said to have been lately purchased… [after  
          towing the Prince Alfred to a small island in the Bahamas] the men [of the Oreto]  
          began to take out of the Prince Alfred her cargo and to put it on board the Oreto.   
          They discharged six 32-pounded broadside guns and two 68-pouder pivot guns,  
          lots of stores, shot, shell, and powder.  This took six days to do, when the Oreto,  
          having these guns mounted on her deck, weighed anchor, hoisted the Confederate  
          flag, her crew manning the rigging and giving three cheers.
62
 
 
Hotze‘s report on the triumphs of the Florida serves as an example of the 
Confederacy‘s success in outwitting Union efforts to prevent the Southern states from 
gaining munitions and ships.  Hotze continued to report on the Florida‘s movements 
during the war, citing an instance where the ship sneaked into the port of Mobile, 
Alabama to resupply. Also, the Florida continued to capture more ships. Hotze later 
related how the Florida captured and burned a ship called the Star of Peace, bound from 
Calcutta, India to Boston, Massachusetts.
63
  The value of the captured cargo was 
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$500,000.
64
  The Florida‘s capture of another Federal schooner was further proof that the 
Confederacy now had the naval capability to successfully raid and capture Union 
vessels.
65
  Hotze used this propaganda to bolster his claim that the Confederacy was a 
viable military power with a chance of victory.  However, the Florida was captured by 
the USS Wachusett on October 7, 1864, in the Bay of San Salvador, Brazil without a shot 
having been fired.
66
  The Florida had been at sea since sneaking out of the port of Brest, 
France eight months earlier, and during this time at sea, the Florida captured a total of 
thirteen prizes.
67
 The Florida‘s captain had sailed into port to get more fuel and supplies, 
but was pounced upon by the Wachusett.
68
 
Despite losing their chance at stopping the Oreto before it sailed and became the 
Florida, both Adams and Dudley were determined to prevent Bulloch‘s next ship from 
being launched.  The 290 was constructed in the John Laird and Company‘s Birkenhead 
Ironworks, a shipyard that had been in business since 1829 and was said to be more 
powerful than her sister vessel.
69
  Bulloch, who kept an ear to the ground for news from 
the British government concerning any possible intervention, reported that Lord Russell 
seemed ―more determined than ever to preserve its neutrality...[and] the chances of 
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getting a vessel to sea in anything like fighting condition are next to impossible.‖70  
Bulloch knew that his plan to get the 290 out of British waters had to be top-notch, for 
both Dudley and Adams were investigating the various shipyards in an effort to discover 
Bulloch‘s plans.  Bulloch moved the 290 into a private graving dock in an effort to 
continue her construction unimpeded.  Weeks of surveillance by Dudley and his network 
led to the discovery that the 290 was already under construction, and Dudley reported to 
the Union State Department on April 4, 1862 that the ship was a ―gunboat of eleven 
hundred tons [and] was the exact model of the Florida, with engines of three hundred 
horsepower.‖71  Dudley also reported that he had heard that the Spanish government had 
contracted the ship‘s construction, but he doubted the claim.  Upon making inquiries at 
the Spanish embassy, Adams found that the ambassador there knew nothing about it.
72
  
Dudley further discovered that two Confederate officers who had served on the Sumter 
confirmed that the 290 was indeed meant for service in the Confederacy.
73
  After further 
investigation, Dudley confidently reported to Seward that ―[The 290] will be when 
finished a very superior boat…The order when given was to build her of the very best 
material and in the best & strongest manner without regard to expence and the foreman 
says this has been done….There is no doubt but what she is intended for the Rebels.‖74  
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This evidence became part of the case that both Dudley and Adams presented to the 
British government in an attempt to prevent the 290 from being launched. 
The Union agents repeatedly attempted to stop the 290 from sailing, searching for 
any evidence that Bulloch was breaking the Foreign Enlistment Act or that the ship was 
legally owned by the Confederacy.  Adams and Dudley also pressured Lord Russell to 
act, hoping that they had gathered enough evidence to prove that the 290 was meant to 
serve the Confederacy, and if permitted to launch, would violate British neutrality.  
However, their case relied heavily on hearsay evidence, and there was a lack of 
documented wrongdoing.
75
  Adams insisted that Lord Palmerston‘s ministry abide by its 
declaration of neutrality and stop Bulloch.
76
  Russell debated whether or not to prevent 
the launching of the 290 until the matter was legally clarified, or until Adams and Dudley 
produced more evidence.  As with the Florida, customs officers inspected the 290 and 
reported that while there were powder canisters, no guns or gun carriages were seen.
77
  
After the inspection was completed, the customs office stated that there was not enough 
evidence, physical or otherwise to justify the seizure of the 290, nor was there evidence 
to support the claim that the ship was destined to become a Confederate war vessel.
78
  
Thus, Russell took no action. 
The 290 launched on May 15, 1862, and seemed likely to clear Liverpool by mid-
July, setting course for international waters.
79
  Those plans were delayed, however, when 
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on June 23, Adams tried yet again to convince Russell to prevent the 290 from sailing, 
asking for a warrant to have the ship seized.  This time Adams supplied circumstantial 
information gathered through Dudley‘s spy network, including a number of testimonials 
and evidence gathered through his team of private lawyers that indicated the ship had 
indeed been built as a warship for the Confederacy.
80
  Russell, however, still was not 
convinced.  Dudley finally succeeded in fulfilling Lord Russell‘s demands by submitting 
sworn depositions from Liverpool customs agents, and so demanded the 290’s seizure.81   
Both Adams and the British Foreign Office reminded Lord Russell that if the 290 
was allowed to sail, it might be seen as a declaration of support for the Confederacy, 
which would violate the Queen‘s proclamation of neutrality and even lead to an 
undesired war with the United States, but to Adams‘ and Dudley‘s frustration, Lord 
Russell did not order the ship to be seized.
82
  Lord Russell attempted to justify his delay 
in issuing an arrest warrant, asserting that Britain wished to remain the Union‘s friend but 
also wanted to remain neutral in the conflict by not acting in a manner that might be seen 
as friendly to one side.  Needless to say, the Union was not pleased with this 
explanation.
83
 
Adams and Dudley continued to demand the seizure of the 290, but the British 
Board of Customs refused.  To make matters worse, the paperwork submitted by the two 
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Union agents had been misplaced, and this, in turn, significantly lowered the chances of 
Union success.
84
  In addition to the misplacement of papers, the examination of the 
gathered evidence took quite a long time.
85
 
While the British government was scrambling to recover the misplaced papers 
and thoroughly examine the evidence, Bulloch quickly acted to remove the 290 from 
British waters.  Bulloch sailed the ship, under tugboat escort, for a purported trial cruise 
on the Mersey River.  By the time that Dudley realized that Bulloch had pulled off a hoax 
of massive proportions, it was too late to stop the ship and the 290, successfully escaped 
Britain on July 29, 1862, just a few weeks later than originally planned.
86
  As had 
happened with the Florida, Lord Russell was out of town when the ship escaped British 
waters.  Although his actions gave him an alibi, Lord Russell‘s actions did not bolster his 
claims to uphold British neutrality.  Dudley wrote to Seward that he feared British public 
support for the Union had declined, in part due to General George McClellan‘s losses in 
the Peninsular Campaign and his failure to capture Richmond; Dudley opined that 
McClellan‘s military losses had ―caused the feeling in this country [Britain] against the 
United States and in favor of the South to break out afresh and with increasing 
virulence…. Those who pretended to be neutral now show themselves in their favor… 
The current is against us and it is strong and threatens to carry everything with it.‖87  
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Hotze trumpeted the Confederate victories and the escape of the 290.   In The Index on 
October 30, 1862, the Confederate propagandist commented that the 290 
          has disturbed and altogether unsettled the Federal public… this vessel, which is  
          worthy of being the successor of the Sumter, has played such havoc with the  
          Federal marine, that the rate of insurance has increased 5 per cent.  It is this  
          apparent that the commerce as well as the territory of the North is vulnerable.  If  
          privateering should be facilitated by the Confederate Congress, the north will find  
          its trade completely crippled.
88
 
 
Hotze hoped that if the 290 was successful, it might aid the Confederate goal to gain 
British recognition. 
After escaping from Liverpool, Bulloch had the 290 anchor off the northern coast 
of Ireland, whereupon he arranged for the transport of Raphael Semmes and his crew to 
the Confederate ship along with nineteen cases of goods.
89
  Semmes, his crew, and the 
shipment of supplies reached the 290 on August 20, 1862, and Semmes raised 
Confederate colors five days later, more than prepared to begin raiding Union ships.  The 
290 sailed for the Azores Islands, where she was armed and rechristened the Alabama.  
During her career, the Alabama captured over sixty-six Union vessels and caused more 
than $5 million worth of losses to the Union merchant marine trade in a two-year span, 
taking the most prizes of any Confederate raider.
90
  It seemed once again that Bulloch 
and, by extension, the Confederacy, had outwitted the Union, slipping a powerful warship 
out of Liverpool while Adams and Dudley were tied up in bureaucratic red tape. 
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The Alabama menaced the high seas for two years, and Hotze continued to 
broadcast the ship‘s successes and refute accusations that the Alabama was knowingly 
violating Britain‘s neutrality by seizing British ships.  He remarked in the November 6, 
1862, issue of The Index that there  
          is not a shadow of a pretence for the allegation that Captain Semmes has violated  
          any neutral rights.  He has not knowingly destroyed any British property, even on  
          board the enemy‘s ships; if he has done so unwittingly, England must demand  
          reparation, and the Confederate States must accord it.
91
 
 
Hotze did his utmost to ensure that the Confederacy‘s image was as untarnished as 
possible, declaring that accusations that the Confederacy was acting dishonorably by 
capturing British vessels were false. Hotze heralded the integrity of Semmes, declaring 
that the captain was not a man who would ever violate British neutrality.
92
  Hotze‘s 
declaration that the Alabama was indeed obeying international law was also used to 
discredit Northern cruisers.  For example, Hotze related an incident in which the British 
ship Blanche was halted off the coast of Cuba by a Union man-of-war; the Blanche tried 
to escape, whereupon the Union ship gave chase, captured the Blanche, and set her 
afire.
93
   
The successful escape of the Alabama, combined with British Foreign Secretary 
Lord Palmerston‘s refusal to issue a warrant for the arrest of the Confederate warship, 
deeply upset some northerners.  Many wrote to their local newspapers condemning 
Britain for allowing a Confederate ship not only to be built within her borders, but then 
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allowing that vessel to escape unscathed.  One anonymous writer to the New York Herald 
on October 10, 1862, questioned: ―Is this the neutrality which the British government 
proclaimed?  Is this friendship which it manifests towards a nation with whom it 
professes to be on terms of peace and animity [sic]? ...It is easier to deal with an open 
enemy than with a concealed one.‖94  Many northerners could not fathom why Britain 
allowed a Confederate agent to build two ships in her shipyards and then permitted those 
ships to sail out of Liverpool to attack Union ships. There was great bitterness over what 
some considered to be Britain‘s betrayal.   
The downfall of the Alabama occurred in 1864 when she got into a battle with the 
USS Kearsarge off the coast of France.  The Alabama was in a dilapidated state, and 
Semmes knew that his ship needed to resupply, so he chose Cherbourg as the site at 
which to undergo repairs.
95
  While waiting for permission to enter the harbor and go into 
dry-dock, the Kearsage sailed into view.  The ships battled on June 19, 1864, in a dueling 
fashion, with each ship‘s guns facing the other.96  In less than an hour, the Alabama was 
destroyed, and her survivors were rescued by the Kearsarge, and a number of other 
spectator vessels.
97
  When the survivors of the Alabama arrived in Southampton, they 
were given a rousing welcome, with the London Standard commenting, ―Every TRUE 
Englishman will regret to learn that the gallant Alabama has gone to her last resting 
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place.‖98  When word reached the Union of the Alabama’s downfall, celebrations and 
parades broke out, and The New York Times discussed the ship‘s sinking for several 
weeks following the battle.
99
 
Up to her valiant fight to the finish, the Alabama was quite a morale-booster for 
the Confederacy.
100
  Hotze made sure to publish every capture and victory by the 
Alabama, and he desperately tried to use her victories to convince the British government 
and populace that the Confederacy would be victorious and thus deserved British 
recognition and support.  The warm welcome given to the crew of the Alabama upon 
their arrival in Southampton indicated that the exploits of the Alabama had excited the 
imagination of the British people, and in winning their support, Hotze‘s propaganda 
efforts obviously achieved some success.  But even though some of the British populace 
cheered on the Alabama, this support was certainly not enough to sway the position of the 
British government in regard to the American Civil War.  By this point, Britain seemed 
determined to maintain her neutrality, a position she would defend throughout the 
remainder of the war. The victories of a few ships were not enough; in all probability, 
only consistent major Confederate victories over the Union, perhaps combined with other 
economic incentives might have had a chance to bring about the much desired diplomatic 
recognition; thus Hotze‘s propaganda efforts were in vain.  
Although the actions of the Alabama, and to a lesser degree, the Florida, led to 
increased tensions between the Union and Great Britain, they were not enough to alienate 
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the two permanently.  Following the war, Secretary of State Seward, arguing that Britain 
had failed to maintain her neutrality by not preventing the Alabama from sailing, insisted 
upon a British apology and some land concessions (at first parts of Canada, then later, the 
Bahamas) as reparations for the Alabama’s damages to Union shipping.101  Seward was 
unsuccessful in getting Britain to agree to his demands, and it was not until President 
Ulysses Grant‘s administration that an agreement was reached.  In 1871, the claims of 
both sides were submitted to a tribunal in Geneva, and after much delay and argument by 
both sides the tribunal announced on September 14, 1872, that Britain owed the Union 
$15.5 million, including interest, for the damage caused by the Alabama and her sister 
ships.
102
 
When the Civil War ended with the Union victorious over the Confederacy, Great 
Britain was still neutral.  The exploits of propagandists, spies, and ships such as the 
Florida and the Alabama were not enough to bring about the recognition the Confederacy 
so desperately sought.   
 Hotze was a brilliant propagandist, but he was often short of funds.  This affected 
his ability to hire spies and publish additional propaganda.  Further efforts by James 
Bulloch to secure additional naval vessels for the Confederacy ended in failure, and the 
two ironclad rams he did commission in 1863 were seized and then bought by the British 
government.  Clearly, the Union anger over the Florida and especially the Alabama did 
influence the British government to be more careful about living within the bounds of its 
proclaimed neutrality.  Nevertheless, if the Confederacy had been able to win at 
Gettysburg and Vicksburg, which surely would have been touted by its diplomats and 
                                                             
101 Foreman, A World on Fire, 795-801.   
 
102 Ibid., 803.  
 109 
propagandists, British recognition and aid might have been possible.  However, the 
turning of the tide in favor of the Union that occurred in 1862 in Great Britain, and in 
July 1863 in the United States, put an end to any Confederate hope of British support. 
With moral issue of slavery still looming, and now the eventual defeat of the 
Confederacy becoming more certain, Great Britain was not going to jeopardize her 
stability, profits, and reputation by granting the Confederacy recognition and support.  
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Conclusion 
When the Civil War ended, Henry Hotze faded from public view.  He never 
returned to America, but he may have continued to write, for his obituary mentioned that 
he received ―various decorations from foreign governments for services as a publicist.‖1  
That suggests that he had not limited himself as just a propagandist for the Confederate 
States of America.  Hotze died in Zug, Switzerland on April 19, 1887.
2
 
Until the end of war, Adams, Dudley and Morse continued to gather information 
for the Union.  Sanford, too, continued to gather information from his post in Belgium.  
Charles Francis Adams served as the American Ambassador to Great Britain until 1868, 
after which he returned to America and became a member of the Board of Overseers of 
Harvard University; he died in Boston on November 21, 1886.  Following the end of the 
Civil War, Thomas Haines Dudley returned to his native New Jersey, and built a large 
house on an estate near Camden, where he maintained his involvement in Republican 
Party politics; he died in Philadelphia of a heart attack on April 15, 1893.
3
  Freeman 
Harlowe Morse served as U.S. consul to London until 1870, but he never returned to the 
United States following his retirement; he died in Surbiton, Surrey, England on February 
5, 1891.
4
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As these men faded from public view, so too did some of their activities fade in 
public memory.  As time passed, so did the memories of the propagandists and their 
efforts.  Both the Union and the Confederacy attempted to convince the British 
government and people that theirs was the side to support as they battled during the 
American Civil War.  Both sides used propaganda – in the forms of pamphlets, 
newspaper articles, and magazines, information gathering, dissemination, disinformation, 
and essays.  Even though the Union diplomats arrived only shortly before those of the 
Confederacy, the Union had a history of diplomatic relations with Britain, and those 
relationships served that nation well. It also had established access to the British media.  
The Confederacy, on the other hand, had to start from scratch. 
Besides Adams, Sanford, Dudley, and Morse, the Union agents included 
Secretary of State William Seward‘s four-man commission, in particular the wily 
Thurlow Weed, Seward‘s former campaign manager.  The Union had more money and 
used it to hire private agents and detectives to gather information, to print pro-Union 
articles in British and Continental newspapers, and to support its cause.  The Confederacy 
was often short of funds, but managed to conduct quite a propaganda campaign despite 
that.  The major Confederate agents included James Mason and John Slidell, the two 
Confederate ambassadors to Europe, with Mason assigned to Great Britain and Slidell to 
France, and former Union naval officer James Dunwoody Bulloch, and Major James 
Caleb Huse.  However, without a doubt, the outstanding propaganda agent on either side 
was Henry Hotze, the brilliant journalist, who devised a campaign to sway British public 
opinion to the Confederate side.   
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President Jefferson Davis and other officials in the Confederacy began the war 
fully expecting diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy by Great Britain.  The primary 
reason behind this expectation was cotton.  The American South had long been the 
primary global producer of raw cotton, and her primary market was Great Britain, with its 
huge textile industry. Davis and others believed that recognition would pave the way for 
commercial treaties and alliances; furthermore, they believed that once Great Britain 
granted recognition to the Confederacy, much of the rest of Europe would follow, 
facilitating the purchase of critical war supplies, weapons, food, and even uniforms.  
Some in the Confederacy even believed that Great Britain would have to militarily 
intervene if the Union blockade interfered with the shipments of Confederate cotton to 
Great Britain.  In fact, the Confederacy was so certain that its cotton was the key to 
gaining British recognition that it instituted a cotton embargo.  The embargo was meant 
to oblige the British government to show its support for the Confederacy.  What the 
Confederacy apparently failed to consider was the effect of the embargo on the 
Confederacy itself.   
Things did not work out as the Confederacy thought that they would.  British 
recognition did not come quickly, and the Confederacy soon recognized that it would 
have to do more to convince the British government to grant the sought-after recognition.  
One tactic was propaganda.  After establishing a permanent minister in Great Britain – 
James Mason – the Confederacy sent Henry Hotze there to establish and operate its 
propaganda machine.  Hotze‘s Index was a masterly mouthpiece. In the Index, Hotze 
published articles, quoted statistics, made observations, and generally published 
everything he could that was favorable to the Confederacy and unfavorable to the Union. 
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The Union also resorted to propaganda, but not necessarily to make Great Britain 
intervene on its side.  The Union preferred that Great Britain remain neutral, and this 
meant that the British government would not officially or unofficially support the 
Confederacy.   
There was thus a propaganda war in Great Britain as Union and Confederate 
agents attempted to influence the British.  The stakes were high: should Great Britain 
grant recognition to the Confederacy, it could mean a shift in the momentum of the war, 
and in the early years of the war, the momentum already seemed to be on the side of the 
Confederacy. 
When the Confederacy decided to have ships purchased or built in Great Britain 
that could be used in the war with the Union, the Union became quite concerned.  That 
concern increased when the Confederacy sent James Bulloch to Britain to negotiate 
contracts to have two warships built.  The two warships, the Oreto, later renamed the 
Florida and the 290, later renamed the Alabama, sailed out of English shipyards despite 
strong attempts by Union representatives to stop them from doing so.  Together, the two 
ships captured almost eighty Union vessels and captured hundreds of thousands of dollars 
of cargo.  Hotze gleefully reported on every victory of both ships, using them to capture 
the imagination – and, he hoped, active support - of the British people.  He disseminated 
the stories to show that the Confederacy could still win the war.  But he could not 
convince the British government to abandon its neutral stance.  
In the end, what impact did the intense propaganda employed by both the Union 
and the Confederacy have in Great Britain?  British society remained divided in its 
support of the Union or the Confederacy, and while there were some in the British 
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government who vigorously supported the Confederates, most preferred to remain neutral 
rather than risk ending up on the losing side of the American conflict.  It appears that 
neither the Union‘s nor the Confederacy‘s propaganda had much of an effect in changing 
those sentiments.  Despite all of its propaganda efforts, the Confederacy was ultimately 
unable to convince the British government to grant it the diplomatic recognition it so 
desperately sought.  As the Civil War began, Great Britain maintained its neutrality, and 
when the Civil War ended, Great Britain still maintained its neutrality. 
Does this mean that the Union‘s propaganda efforts were successful, especially 
given that the Union goal was to convince Great Britain to remain neutral?  The answer is 
apparently ―No.‖  All evidence supports the fact that Great Britain remained neutral 
because it was in her best interests to do so.  Great Britain was making huge profits by 
selling war supplies to both sides, and since it had built up a large cotton surplus prior to 
the outbreak of the Civil War, it resisted Confederate pressure for recognition.  
Furthermore, Great Britain was quite reluctant to become involved in an internal and 
unpredictable American conflict. Finally, had Britain supported one or the other side, 
support could have led to intervention, and that could have destabilized Great Britain 
internally and also destabilized her relationship with Europe and the rest of the world.  
Thus, despite all of the pressure tactics employed by both the Union and the Confederacy, 
they had temporary or minimal effects.  In the end, the Confederacy never gained that 
sought after recognition, and Britain‘s choice to remain neutral most likely stemmed from 
internal rather than Union pressure.  Great Britain‘s actions were based on its 
determination to do what was best for its long-term interests, and no amount of 
propaganda could alter that determination. 
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